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Thesis Summary 
This thesis examines how rats represent relationships in their environment. There are 
currently two broad classes of account of how animals learn about such relationships: The 
associative account offers a relatively simple mechanistic account of behaviour; while the 
second account proposes that animal behaviour, like human behaviour, is underpinned by the 
processes of causal and deductive reasoning, that are beyond associative analyses. Chapter 1 
identifies three domains in which these two classes of account provide quite different 
analyses of animal behaviour, which are experimentally investigated in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
Chapter 2 reports three experiments that investigated the accuracy of predictions 
derived from the claim that rats are capable of forming and using causal models involving 
their own interactions with their environment (interventions) and external events (Blaisdell, 
Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006). The results failed to confirm these predictions and were 
instead more consistent with the operation of simpler processes.  
The results from Chapter 2 left open two interpretations: either rats can represent 
causality but do not use such representations to reason, or they do not represent cause per se. 
Chapter 3 investigated these alternatives in three experiments using a timing task, which 
should be sensitive to whether rats are more likely to represent their actions as causal than 
external events (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). The results provided no support for the view 
that causal binding occurs in rats.  
Chapter 3 examined the possibility that sensory preconditioning might reflect a form 
of deductive reasoning (Hall, 1990). However, taken together, the results from four 
experiments provided no support for such an analysis; but instead helped to inform the nature 
of the associative processes that underlie sensory preconditioning.  
9 
 
 In summary, while the results reported in this thesis provide no support for analyses 
of animal behaviour that rely on the processes of causal or deductive reasoning, they do help 
to inform the nature of the associative processes involved.  
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
1.1. The study of animal behaviour: A selective review 
The academic study of animal behaviour stems from the development of Charles 
Darwin’s (1859) influential theory of evolution. In his book describing the mechanism and 
outcome of evolution, Darwin hinted at the idea that humans had evolved from simpler 
animals. This was a controversial proposition at the time of publication, and he did not 
expand upon this notion until the 1870s, when he also entertained the complimentary idea of 
mental and behavioural similarity between humans and animals (Darwin, 1871). It was this 
idea, that human intelligence has evolved, which sparked an interest in the study of mental 
processes of animals from an anthropocentric viewpoint. 
The question of whether animals process information and think about the world in an 
analogous manner to humans was entertained by Romanes (1882), who began observing 
animal behaviour and explaining it in terms of human thought processes. He argued that 
evolutionary pressures resulted in the need for a development of intelligence, and that this 
intelligence is shared with animals, from ants to dogs. Nonhuman animals, he argued, have 
rich ways of representing the texture of their environment, and possess cognitive processes 
that are equivalent to those of humans. However, Romanes had little evidence for his claims, 
and Morgan (1894) was the first to suggest that experiments should be conducted in order to 
assess the cognitive abilities of animals. In his book Introduction to Comparative Psychology, 
Morgan directly considered the appropriate means to assess the mental capacities of other 
species. He took issue with people projecting human methods of thinking and reasoning onto 
animals, as evolution has resulted in an enormous variety of species, which in turn, he 
argued, must have also formed divergent types of “mind” (defined in his book as any type of 
mental activity). He noted, however, that people tend to see a final behaviour and explain it in 
terms of complex human cognitive ability without evidence of this kind of process. From his 
13 
 
own observations, he saw that method by which animals learned a particular response was 
slow, and achieved by simple trial-and-error learning. He thus argued that a more scientific 
method should be advocated, and that complex cognition should not be merely assumed. He 
thus stated his canon; “in no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise 
of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one 
which stands lower in the psychological scale” (p53). That is, if there are two mental 
processes available to explain an animal’s behaviour, the simpler of the two alternatives 
should be favoured, until the more complex account can be proven. Comparative psychology, 
he argued, needs to discover the limits of animal psychology, and distinguish the cognitive 
level any given animal has obtained.  
Although the canon has recently been criticised as the sole basis upon which to 
arbitrate between different accounts of animal behaviour (e.g., Heyes, 2012), it highlights the 
importance of at least considering simple accounts of behaviour. Logically, there is no reason 
that a simpler account is preferable, and Heyes’ objection to the canon is centred on the idea 
that it appears to use associative learning as the default explanation of behaviour, rather than 
a contender. Perhaps the canon should not be taken at face value, but even so, it should be 
kept in mind that one should not assume complex behaviour without ruling out simpler 
accounts. In a similar vein, Heyes argued that in order to distinguish between associative and 
more cognitive explanations, further experiments need to be run to rule out one or the other 
as a potential explanation. Whether Morgan’s canon or Heyes’ critique is accepted, it seems 
clear that adjudication between alternative accounts is best served by experimental analysis.  
At the turn of the
 
20
th
 century, new approaches to the study of animal behaviour began 
to emerge. Thorndike (1911) and Pavlov (1927) provided clear descriptions of some of the 
earliest formal studies of animal cognition. Their experimental procedures arranged 
contingencies in an animal’s environment (e.g., between an action and an outcome or 
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between one stimulus and an outcome), and measured changes in the animal’s behaviour. For 
instance, Pavlov provided hungry dogs with food immediately following a tone, and 
measured salivation. He observed that initially only the delivery of food (the unconditioned 
stimulus, US) would elicit salivation (the unconditioned response, UR), but after a succession 
of tone-food pairings, the dogs salivated not only during the food, but also during the tone 
alone. This classical conditioning procedure differed from Thorndike’s (1911) approach, 
wherein animals were only reinforced with an outcome (escape from a box and access to 
food) following certain behaviours (pressing a catch or lever). The measurement taken was 
the latency to escape the box, and it was observed that the time taken decreased as the animal 
learnt the relationship between their behaviour and escape. These two methods of studying 
changes in animal behaviour, based on contingencies arranged by the experimenter, have 
provided the foundation for a vast amount of research on animal learning that has followed.  
Pavlov and Thorndike not only provided reliable methods of assessing animal 
learning, but also suggested a way of understanding the underlying basis of learnt behaviour. 
In fact, earlier than this, Morgan (1894) suggested that animals learn about the contingencies 
in their environments through mental representations, which connected events through 
associations. He argued that neural centres represent certain events, and when these events 
happen in close temporal proximity, the representations are activated and a connection is 
formed. So, for instance, Morgan noted that newborn chicks learnt to avoid pecking cinnabar 
caterpillars, which have an aversive taste. According to his theory, the chick would see the 
caterpillar, which would produce the motor response of pecking, shortly followed by an 
aversive taste. The mental representations of the caterpillar and taste would be activated in 
close succession, and upon later presentation of the caterpillar, the neural representation of 
the caterpillar would now activate the representation of the aversive taste, which would exert 
an inhibitory effect on the motor system and thereby prevent pecking.  
15 
 
This associative analysis, now supported by evidence (see Pavlov, 1927), had a large 
impact on how theorists think about how animals learn about the relationships between 
environmental stimuli. While early learning theorists focused on the nature of associative 
structure (i.e., whether the association was formed between a stimulus and a response, or 
between the stimuli themselves), researchers in the mid-20
th
 Century began to investigate the 
mechanisms underlying association formation, rather than what constituted the associative 
content (Delamater, 2012). Early theorists believed that contiguous pairings of environmental 
stimuli was sufficient to activate mental representations of these stimuli in close succession, 
and that connections are formed automatically (Guthrie, 1935). However, modern theories of 
associative learning in animals, unlike their predecessors, now suppose that mere contiguity 
is an insufficient condition for learning to occur. Although the processes involved in 
association formation are still assumed to be automatic, they are more complex than 
previously imagined. That is, current theories acknowledge that it is not sufficient for the 
elements of association to be presented close together in time. To enter into an association, 
the stimuli must be attended to (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975), and be surprising (e.g., Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972). The following paragraphs will explore these conditions of learning. 
The suggestion that stimuli must be attended to was foreshadowed by Pavlov (1927), 
who observed that dogs presented with a novel light displayed an orienting response (OR), 
which allowed them to observe changes in its environment. Amongst many others, a study by 
Kaye and Pearce (1984) showed that the frequency of the orienting response in rats decreases 
the more a light is exposed. This effect is termed habituation. Habituation training also affects 
subsequent learning about a given stimulus. In the second phase of their study, Kaye and 
Pearce gave the experimental group of rats, who had pre-exposure to the light alone, and 
control rats with no experience with the light, pairings of light with food. That is, whenever 
the light illuminated, food would be delivered. The group who had been habituated to the 
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light showed a slower rate of learning about the relationship between the light and food than 
the control group (see also Hall & Channell, 1985). This effect, known as latent inhibition, 
supports the idea that attention must be paid to stimuli in order to learn about them (e.g., 
Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980)  
The idea that the stimuli must be surprising in order to learn about them is perhaps 
best exemplified by experiments on blocking (Kamin, 1969). Kamin used a conditioned 
suppression procedure in which a CS (A) was first paired with the delivery of a shock. This 
training ordinarily results in the CS suppressing the instrumental baseline response of lever 
pressing. Kamin’s critical finding was that should a second CS (X) be paired with shock in 
the presence of A, then X would not suppress responding when it was presented alone at test. 
This blocking effect, among others, was the motivation for the development of the model 
described by Rescorla and Wagner (1972). To evaluate whether a given behaviour is beyond 
an associative analysis (or associative analyses) one needs first to understand something 
about the details of these analyses. A brief review of such theories follows, by way of 
providing a theoretical backdrop against which to judge whether putative instances of animal 
behaviour, that might have a complex origin, are also explicable in more mundane, 
associative terms.  
1.1.2. Formal theories of association formation 
Rescorla and Wagner (1972) presented a mathematical algorithm to explain how 
associations form (see Formula 1.1). Here, ΔV represents the change in associative strength 
on a given trial, αβ represents the associability of the stimulus (one for the associability of the 
CS (α) and another for the US (β)), λ is the asymptotic level of associative strength the US 
provides, and ΣV is the sum of associative strength for all stimuli present on a given trial. In 
very general terms, this formula can be used to make ordinal predictions about how much 
will be learnt on a given trial; which will be related to the salience of the stimuli (α and β), 
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what is known about the stimuli that are presented on the current trial from previous trials 
(ΣV), and the maximum amount of associative strength the US can support (i.e., λ). Learning 
is proportional to the difference between what is expected to happen and what actually 
happens. 
ΔV = αβ (λ - ΣV)         Formula 1.1 
In a related model, Wagner (1981) showed how the central ideas that underpin the 
Rescorla-Wagner model could be implemented in a set of standard operating procedures 
(SOP) for animal memory. Here, the memory system consists of a series of directional 
associative links, and the memory of a stimulus can be in three states: inactive, whereby the 
stimulus is stored, and not capable of modifying behaviour; A2 when the stimulus is active 
but not present; and A1, in which the stimulus is active in the animal’s attention. When a 
stimulus is presented, the nodal elements representing that stimulus are active in the A1 state. 
The representation is then thought to decay into the A2 state, and finally into the inactive (I) 
state (see Figure 1.1). Within this model, an excitatory association, in which the activation of 
a recipient node is increased, is formed when the CS and US nodes are in the A1 state. When 
the CS node is in the A1 state and the US node is in the A2 state an inhibitory association, in 
which the recipient node decreases in activation, is strengthened between them.
1
 However, 
when the CS node is in the A2 state, no learning occurs. The final assumptions allow the  
                                                                
1
 Especially relevant to the empirical work presented in Chapter 3, is the fact that this already 
powerful model can be extended to deal with temporal order of stimuli, as Wagner (1981) 
argued that a stimulus activates a cascade of elements into A1. For instance, imagine that 
element A, then B, then C are activated during a CS. If a US is presented at the time that 
element C of the CS is activated, then an excitatory association will form between C and the 
US, and activate the US representation when element C is active, rather than during the 
activation of A or B. This differential conditioning between A, B, and C encodes the fact that 
the US is presented at the end, rather than at the beginning, of the CS. 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Wagner’s SOP model, where A1 is the primary state of activation, A2 is the 
secondary state of activation, and I is the inactive state. The arrows represent the movement 
of nodal elements between the states of activation. The arrows from the inactive state 
represent activation of elements into the active states (experience of the stimulus activates 
elements from I into A1, activation by association activates elements from I into A2), 
whereas the other two arrows represent decay of elements.  
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model to explain latent inhibition and the fact that it is context specific, among a broad range 
of other phenomena (Honey, Iordanova, & Good, 2010). Latent inhibition involves repeated 
exposure to a stimulus before presenting trials in which the stimulus is paired with a 
motivationally significant event (e.g., food). The development of conditioned responding 
involving such a preexposed stimulus is usually retarded (as outlined in Section 1.1). 
Wagner’s (1981) SOP explains this in terms of the initial exposure to the stimulus forming an 
association with the context in which it is presented. Thus, when the rat has learnt this 
association, whenever it is placed in the context, a memory of the stimulus will be activated 
into the A2 state. When the stimulus is presented, some elements from the inactive state will 
move into the A1 state, but elements in A2 cannot move directly into A1. The amount that 
can be learnt about the stimulus is limited to the elements active in the A1 state. As this 
amount is less in the context of pre-exposure, learning rate is reduced in comparison to 
control groups (Honey et al., 2010). Due to its ready application to numerous phenomenon, 
the SOP model (along with its various modifications, such as Lin & Honey, 2011) will be 
used as a primary theoretical instrument to gauge whether a given behavioural observation is 
beyond an associative analysis. Of course, if there are yet simpler accounts, that require fewer 
theoretical assumptions (e.g., response competition, generalization decrement, or other 
performance-related constraints) then these will also be identified.  
1.2. From representing casual relations to understanding causation 
The development of formal models of associative learning has allowed an impressive 
range of phenomena to be explained, and the accuracy of novel predictions to be assessed. 
However, it should be noted that the models are relatively simple: a single construct, the 
association, still provided the bulk of the explanatory power. Yet, it has been argued that 
associative learning provides animals with a means of representing the causal structure of 
their environment (e.g., Dickinson, 1980). Indeed even evidence that, at face value, seemed to 
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undermine general process learning theory, can be reinterpreted as supporting the general 
idea that associative processes enable the causal structure of the environment to be 
represented. So, for instance, if you feel nauseous after eating a meal at a new restaurant, you 
would attribute the illness to the meal itself rather than anything associated with the 
restaurant, such as the decor. Similarly, Domjan and Wilson (1972) injected rats with lithium 
chloride (which induces nausea) or saline (a control substance, which does not affect the 
animal) after they had ingested a flavoured solution in the presence of an audiovisual 
stimulus. Rats learnt to avoid the solution but not the audiovisual stimulus. The reverse of 
this was found when rats were given a shock following the taste and audiovisual cues. That 
is, when shocked, rats avoided the audiovisual cues but not the solution. They suggested that 
rats learn about relationships depending on the nature of the stimuli involved (although there 
are other possible explanations reliant on the CS/US contiguity). Dickinson (1980) 
interpreted such findings as suggesting that illness and taste stimuli are more likely to be part 
of the same causal-chain than are illness and audiovisual stimuli (the idea of a causal-chain is 
discussed further below); but supposed that an associative analysis of such selectivity 
remained a viable account. 
Even if one accepted the proposition that associative learning might provide animals, 
including humans, with a means of representing the causal structure of their environments 
this need not imply that associative learning provides the only means of representing causal 
relationships. For example, it has been argued that humans, and other animals, are capable of 
representing causal relationships with what are referred to as causal models (Blaisdell et al., 
2006; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). An experiment by Waldmann and Hagmayer (2005) 
illustrates the operation of such causal models in humans. They provided participants with a 
hypothetical scenario in which scientists hypothesised that the production of three substances  
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(a)
 
(b) 
 
Figure 1.2.  (a) Training conditions in Waldmann and Hagmayer (2005). The left diagram 
displays the causal relationship between the hormones Sonin, Pixin and Xanthan in a causal-
chain arrangement. The right diagram displays the causal relationships in a common-cause 
model. (b) Training design of Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) study. The left diagram displays the 
causal-chain scenario, in which the tone predicts the light, which in turn predicts the delivery 
of food. The right diagram displays the common-cause scenario, in which the light is a cause 
of both the presentation of the tone and delivery of food.  
 
 
 
22 
 
(Pixin, Sonin and Xanthan) were related to one another (see Figure 1.2a). This scenario was 
presented in two conditions: a causal-chain model, whereby scientists hypothesised an 
increase in Sonin caused an increase in Pixin, which in turn increased Xanthan (that is, Sonin 
→ Pixin → Xanthan); and a common-cause model, whereby an increase in Pixin caused an 
increase in Sonin and Xanthan (that is, Sonin ← Pixin → Xanthan). Participants were 
informed that other causal factors may influence the production of certain hormones. 
Alongside this information, the participants were provided with hypothetical data showing 
the levels of the three substances in chimpanzee studies; eight of which had elevated levels of 
all substances, eight with normal levels of the substances, and four with varying levels of the 
substances. Both conditions revealed a probability of .9 between all the causal links in the 
models. So, for instance, if Pixin changed in strength, there was a probability of .9 that 
Xanthan would behave in the same manner. The test presented participants with another 
hypothetical situation whereby the level of Sonin levels had increased or decreased either by 
means of an intervention or the change in Sonin levels was merely observed. That is, an 
intervention whereby an action directly manipulated the levels of substances, in comparison 
to an observed change with no known manipulation.  
Participants in Waldmann and Hagmayer’s (2005) study were asked how many 
animals would have an increased level of Xanthan given different variations in Sonin. The 
results revealed that participants can derive from this data that when an increase/decrease in 
Sonin is observed in the common-cause model, Pixin levels would have had to increase or 
decrease accordingly to cause the change in Sonin. In the causal-chain model, Pixin would 
have increased or decreased as an effect of the levels of Sonin. However, when an 
intervention is included, which directly changes the levels of Sonin, the predictions from the 
two types of model changes. In the causal-chain model, an increase in Sonin would cause an 
increase in Pixin, and in turn Xanthan. In the common-cause model, Sonin is an effect, not a 
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cause, and therefore, a change in the amount of Sonin will have no influence on the other 
substances.  
 The results revealed that humans distinguish between the effects that actions and 
external stimuli have on events in the environment. Causal model theory assumes that this is 
due to the fact that we are aware of the directionality of cause and effect, and understand the 
implications of actions through experience. One way to illustrate this formal derivation is 
through an everyday example described by Clayton and Dickinson (2006). When we know 
that rain (analogous to Pixin) can wet windows and clothing on a washing line (analogous to 
Sonin and Xanthan in the common-cause group), the observation of the wet windows can 
lead to the inference that the washing on the line is becoming damp (Clayton & Dickinson, 
2006). This form of inference must reflect the assumption that the observed effect (wet 
windows) is the result of its frequently observed cause (rain), which should also produce the 
second effect (damp clothes); and should then set in train an appropriate course of action 
(retrieving the washing). However, if one knows that there is an alternative cause for the first 
effect (e.g., a sprinkler is operating near the windows, but not the washing) then it should no 
longer be inferred that the washing is also getting wet. That is, the sprinkler is a direct 
manipulation of the events in the causal model. Under these conditions, the response of 
retrieving the clothes is not required. Modulation of the behaviour that is provoked by a 
stimulus (wet windows), as a function of the origin of that stimulus, is predicted by causal 
model theory (for a review see, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2006). However, in this 
paradigm, an observation only occurs within the framework of the three substances within the 
casual model. That is, there is no knowledge of an alternative cause, in this instance a 
sprinkler, manipulating the events. Thus, the predictions derived from observations and 
interventions will be different. However, this procedure did not require the participants to 
interact directly with the events within the model – they were provided with the relationships 
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and asked to make inferences from them. It would be interesting to see what results would be 
obtained if the participants had to derive the causal models themselves. Although this is not 
an immediate concern of this thesis, it should be evident that when rats are given an 
analogous situation they are required to learn or derive the putative causal models from 
experience. Section 1.2.1 will outline how the rat version of this task is conducted (see also 
Figure 1.2b). 
1.2.1. Do animals form causal models? 
One commonly used method for assessing the ability of animals to understand 
causality is by examining their ability to use tools in the trap-tube task (e.g., Fujita, 
Kuroshima, & Asai, 2003; Martin-Ordas, Call, & Colmenares, 2008; Santos, Pearson, 
Spaepen, Tsao, & Hauser, 2006; Tebbich & Bshary, 2004; Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994). 
Here, animals are required to retrieve a piece of food from a transparent tube with a stick. On 
the face of things, this requires the animal to understand the cause (movement of the stick) 
and effect (movement of the food) of the situation, along with the effects of gravity. While 
this method could potentially be used to assess causal judgements in non-human primates and 
birds, extensive training with the apparatus was often required which raises the possibility 
that performance might be governed by trial and error rather than reasoning. 
Hall (1990) stated that “given appropriate conditions of training, many animals may 
be better at reasoning than we have supposed” (p178). So, it appeared to be a fundamental 
advance when Blaisdell et al. (2006) developed a new paradigm which could be run in an 
operant chamber, using a simple behavioural paradigm to demonstrate a form of reasoning in 
rats. Their task was developed from an analysis of causal model theory (for a review see, 
Waldmann et al., 2006), and was effectively a rat-based version of the type of reasoning task 
used in humans (see Section 1.2) by Waldmann and Hagmayer (2005). While humans were 
presented with causal diagrams along with data, rats were trained using individual links of a 
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causal model. More specifically, the training scenario that Blaisdell et al. (2006) gave their 
rats is analogous to the everyday situation described above (see Figure 1.2b). In their study, 
rats first received training in which one stimulus A (e.g., a light - analogous to raindrops) 
served as the "common-cause" for two separate effects: B (e.g., a clicker - wet windows), and 
the delivery of sucrose into a food well (damp clothes). This common-cause treatment was 
arranged by giving rats separate AB and Asucrose trials. During the subsequent test, B 
was presented and the tendency of rats to approach the food well was examined as a function 
of whether the presentation of B was contingent upon rats pressing a lever (intervene 
condition) or simply occurred without apparent cause (observe condition). Other rats were 
trained according to a “causal-chain” scenario, where the order of A and B were reversed 
(i.e., BA and Asucrose trials). In this condition, rats might be expected to respond to B 
irrespective of whether it occurred as a function of their own behaviour, because the chain of 
associations linking B to sucrose would be unaffected by the manner in which B appeared. 
Blaisdell et al. observed that when the rats had received common-cause training, they were 
less likely to approach the food well during B in the intervene condition than in the observe 
condition. In contrast, this was not the case when they had received causal-chain training. 
That is, there is an interaction, which mirrored the results on human participants conducted 
by Waldmann and Hagmayer (2005). 
 Blaisdell et al. (2006) claimed that rats had an understanding of the implication of the 
lever press within the causal model, and thus were capable of forming and using causal 
models. However, as mentioned previously in Section 1.1, Morgan’s (1894) canon suggests 
that we should rule out simpler alternatives before appealing to more complex processes. 
Indeed, given certain simple assumptions, the results presented by Blaisdell et al. (2006) can 
be explained in terms of the operation of a very simple process (i.e., response competition). 
Referring back to the behavioural task presented to the rats in the study, the alternative cause 
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of the auditory stimulus was a lever press. For the rat to explore the lever, it would have to 
move away from the food magazine. Thus, it is clear that any tendency to interact with the 
lever would interfere with any tendency to interact with the food magazine. Thus, 
competition between responses could have contributed to the lower levels of magazine 
responding during the auditory stimulus when it occurred as a consequence of a rat’s own 
actions. If correct, this very simple account suggests that, across experimental conditions, 
there should be a reciprocal relationship between the tendency to press the lever and the 
tendency to enter the food magazine during the auditory stimulus. That is, all experimental 
conditions ought to be assessed on lever pressing activity, as if, for instance, there are higher 
lever pressing rates during the intervene conditions, this can explain why there is less 
nosepoking activity in those conditions. The original data do not speak to the possibility of 
response competition because lever press responses were not recorded (for all conditions) as 
a function of whether they occurred during the auditory stimuli (Dwyer, Starns, & Honey, 
2009).  
 Dwyer et al. (2009) noted the above criticism, and replicated the procedures used by 
Blaisdell et al. (2006) while recording lever press responses in a manner that allowed a direct 
test of any response competition. Briefly, during the critical auditory stimuli, a reciprocal 
relationship was found whereby food magazine responding was low when lever pressing was 
high. Unfortunately, however, they were not able to replicate the theoretically vital 
interaction from the original study whereby the actions only interfered with magazine 
responding during the auditory stimulus in the common-cause condition but not the causal-
chain condition (but see, Leising, Wong, Waldmann, & Blaisdell, 2008). Thus, while there is 
direct evidence that lever press and food-magazine responses do compete with each other in 
this type of study (and so the idea that response competition might contribute to the observed 
behaviour is supported), I know of no experiment where this possibility can be directly tested 
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as an account of the interaction between the effects of the manipulation of training condition 
(common-cause versus direct cause or causal-chain) and the test condition (observe versus 
intervene).  
 It should be noted that the existence of competition between lever press and magazine 
responses does not, in itself, invalidate the claim that rats might be capable of causal 
reasoning. As aforementioned, logically, the fact that there is a simpler alternative does not 
mean that a cognitive process is not occurring. The response competition may be obscuring 
any causal behaviour, and thus the simpler alternative should not be assumed to be true 
(Heyes, 2012). That is, if response competition was removed as a variable, and the result is 
consistent with causal model theory, then the causal account may explain the behaviour. 
Thus, the first aim of this thesis was to extend the empirical investigation of the possibility 
that rats might be capable of causal reasoning using the procedures developed by Blaisdell 
and his colleagues. The results of this investigation will be presented in Chapter 2, where an 
account based on the idea that rats engage in causal reasoning using causal models, is 
contrasted with alternative theoretical analyses based upon response competition, in the first 
instance, and a modification of Wagner’s SOP, in the second instance. 
1.3. Causal binding 
 The studies conducted by Blaisdell et al. (2006) assume not only that rats can engage 
in causal reasoning, but that they do so in a particular manner. As such, any failure to observe 
results consistent with the predictions of causal model theory might be due to either a failure 
of the rats to represent causal structures at all, or perhaps be due to them not utilising causal 
knowledge in the way supposed by causal model theory. Thus a more general question is 
whether animals represent cause-effect relationships in a way that goes beyond associations 
between the events involved. One informative approach to this issue is to examine potential 
markers of causal representation that do not involve additional inferential processes.  
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 It is generally accepted among cognitive psychologists that humans use more complex 
reasoning methods that work alongside an associative mechanism (see, Evans, 2008 for a 
review on the dual process account of human cognition). However, it is argued that the 
human sensory system does not perceive causal relationships directly; instead causality is 
inferred from evidence provided by the senses, such as contiguity and contingency of events 
(Shanks, Holyoak, & Medin, 1996). This idea was suggested by David Hume, who argued 
that causality is an illusion based on associations. This idea is supported by the fact that 
perceivable information in the environment has an impact on the perception of causality. A 
well-established phenomenon in the human literature is that of intentional or causal binding 
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). This binding effect 
highlights the difference between observations and interventions as causes of events. A 
person’s perception of time differs depending on whether an action is the cause of an event, 
or an observed external stimulus is.  
People’s sense of time was first measured formally by Libet, Gleason, Wright and 
Pearl (1983), who created a method whereby participants had to match an event with the time 
on a fast moving clock. This methodology was later employed to assess how the perception 
of causality was affected by whether the cause of an outcome was self-generated or not 
(Haggard et al., 2002). Participants had to report when certain events occurred. In one 
condition, the outcome was produced by the participant’s own action, in the other it was 
produced by an external stimulus (a tone). Haggard et al.’s (2002) results revealed that an 
action resulting in an outcome was perceived as closer together in time than the same 
outcome caused by an external event, and argued that people temporally bound actions to 
their effects. They termed this effect intentional binding, as they believed it provided 
evidence for the view that actions are different from external events in that actions are 
intentional. Haggard et al.’s (2002) analysis is consistent with the view expressed previously 
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that in human cognition, “the psychological antecedent of an instrumental act is the 
interaction of a belief (or representation) that there is a causal relation between the action and 
its outcome, with a desire for that outcome through a process of practical inference” 
(Dickinson & Shanks, 1995, p6). So, for example, when you turn on a light, you do so as you 
want the outcome of illumination to occur, and believe that the action of pressing the switch 
will turn on the light. 
 However, a potential issue with this methodology was noted in a later study (Buehner 
& Humphreys, 2009): Haggard et al. (2002) used subjective reports, rather than a more direct 
measure of behavioural data. Buehner and Humphreys (2009) used a stimulus anticipation 
task, whereby participants were given two conditions (as with Haggard et al., 2002 study); 
one where an outcome was dependent on an action (causal-control condition), the other when 
it was the result of an external cue (baseline condition). Figure 1.3 shows the experimental 
procedure in diagrammatic form. In the exposure phase of training, participants were 
presented with the two trial types. In the baseline condition, two preparatory tones preceded 
Tone 1 (T1), which then had a delay followed by Tone 2 (T2). In the causal-control 
condition, however, participants would respond on a key (R1), and this would produce T2. In 
the training phase, participants were asked to synchronise their responses with the 
presentation of T1. The only difference at this point was that in the causal-control condition, 
the response at T1 is causally linked to the outcome, T2. Finally, in the experimental phase, 
participants were required to synchronise their responses to T1, but also to T2 (R2). Again, 
the only difference between the conditions was that in the causal-control condition, R1 and 
T2 were causally related. Participants were required to produce the same response in both 
conditions. The results of the experiment supported earlier findings of binding actions to their  
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Figure 1.3. Methodology employed by Buehner and Humphreys (2009). T1 and T2 are a 
tones separated by a time interval, R1 and R2 are responses required to be synchronised with 
the two tones respectively. In the baseline condition, the two tones are related, whereas in the 
causal-control condition, R1 is causally related to T2. 
 
 
 
Baseline                       Causal-control
condition                           condition
T1                 T2                   R1                 T2
R1                                        R1
T1                 T2                   T1                 T2
T1                 T2                   T1                 T2
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outcomes, as participants judged T2 as earlier in the causal-control condition than in the 
baseline condition. However, Buehner and Humphreys termed the effect causal binding, as in 
both conditions there was an action involved, so intentionality and agency were controlled 
for. Their results instead suggested that it was the knowledge of causality that produced the 
effect.  
 The study of timing in animals has a long and illustrious history (Shettleworth, 1998). 
For example, Pavlov (1927) provided dogs with a three minute whistle predicting the delivery 
of weak acid into its mouth. Dogs salivated most in the final minute of the whistle, providing 
evidence for the notion that animals are sensitive to time intervals. More recently, a novel 
technique was developed for studying timing processes, where animals were reinforced with 
food a fixed length of time after a signal, such as a tone, had been presented (Roberts, 1981). 
These reinforced trials were intermixed with some non-reinforced trials, in which the 
accuracy of the animal’s knowledge of elapsed time was assessed. So, for example, when a 
rat in a skinner box expects food a certain interval after a CS, the rate of responding would be 
measured as the length of time per second the rat has its snout in the food well. From this, a 
timing curve can be produced, where the response rates increase to a peak (where the animal 
most expects food), and then trail off to baseline rates of responding until the next trial. The 
most accurate measure of a rat’s expectancy of food is through a curve fitting procedure, 
which reveals the peak time of responding using a line of best fit through the data points 
obtained. This procedure will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 Formal theories of timing (e.g., Scalar Expectancy Theory, SET; Gibbon, 1977) were 
developed to account for the behavioural characteristics of timing behaviour in animals. SET 
assumes that there is a pacemaker, which is used to send pulses to an accumulator, which 
compares the current number of pulses to the memory the rat has of the number of pulses that 
preceded reward delivery on previous trials. The key principles of this theory are that 
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responding will occur when the difference between the current number of pulses and the 
stored memory exceeds some threshold, and that this difference is scaled as a function of the 
size of the stored interval. These principles allow SET to explain the fact that the variability 
in the time of responding around an expected value scales with the size of that expected 
value. In light of the present concerns, it is important to note that there is no formal statement 
within the theory regarding the nature of the signal which begins the timing process. As such, 
SET makes no explicit predictions of differences between timing from external events or 
internally produced actions. This absence of a formal inclusion of the nature of the stimulus 
which initiates timing is shared by other formal theories of timing behaviour. For example, 
Machado’s (1997), Learning to Time (LeT) theory assumes that a series of behavioural states 
is activated by an event, and that the activity of these states rises and falls in series. Because 
of this serial activation, the degree of activity in a particular state at the time of reward 
delivery will depend on the temporal interval between the event which began the timing 
sequence and the time of the reward delivery – the states that are most active at this time will 
become best with the response (e.g., lever pressing or nosepoke activity). LeT assumes that 
the rate at which activity transitions between states is inversely proportional to the temporal 
interval involved, and so it can also account for the scalar properties of timing behaviour. 
However, the rate of transition between states is not formally linked to the type of event 
which began the cascade, and so it also makes no explicit prediction regarding timing from 
external cues or actions.  
 In short, while formal timing theories make different predictions with respect to what 
animals learn in timing tasks, they make the same prediction about timing following an action 
versus timing following an external cue. That is, neither of the theories noted here, nor other 
related timing accounts, makes a distinction between whether the temporal referent is an 
action or an external cue. Although there have been many studies of animal timing, the 
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question of whether timing is influenced by whether the temporal referent is an observed 
stimulus or an intervention (e.g., a lever press response) has not been addressed, and 
seemingly the default assumption in theories of timing is that there is no difference. 
Waldmann and Hagmayer (2005) however, argued that observational and interventional cues 
are fundamentally different in causal learning, as predictions derived from events can differ 
depending on whether one has caused the outcome, or merely observed it. The findings of 
Buehner and Humphreys (2009) and Haggard et al. (2002) suggest that timing in humans is 
influenced by whether the referent is an action or an external stimulus. The question of 
interest here is whether timing in animals is influenced in a similar way. If animals represent 
cause-effect relationships, they would be expected to treat interventions and observations 
differently. That is, if timing behaviour is subject to causal binding then timing when food 
will occur should be less accurate on interventional trials than observational trials. More 
specifically, the peak in responding should occur earlier in the interval after a response than 
after an external stimulus. This issue is investigated in Chapter 3. It should be noted that this 
is an interesting prediction because current theories of animal timing (e.g., SET and LeT) 
make no fundamental distinction between the temporal referents used to time (e.g., Gibbon, 
1977; Machado, 1997). Similarly, associative analyses of timing derived from Wagner’s 
(1981) SOP make no distinction, in principle, between the two types of time marker: both a 
response and a stimulus might generate a cascade of elements that could be used as a basis 
for timing behaviour.  
1.4. Sensory preconditioning as deductive reasoning 
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, Blaisdell et al. (2006) provided their control rats with 
what they referred to as a causal-chain scenario. That is, rats were provided with an auditory 
cue (CS1) which predicted a light (CS2), which in turn predicted the delivery of food (see 
Figure 1.2b). This type of training procedure is better known in the associative learning 
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literature as sensory preconditioning (e.g., Rescorla, 1980; Rizley & Rescorla, 1972). While 
the associative analysis of sensory preconditioning will be discussed in detail later, what 
Blaisdell et al. (2006) claimed about this causal-chain condition is particularly important. As 
Section 1.2.1 outlined, this procedure resulted in nosepoke responding following the 
presentation of CS1. Presumably, this depends on rats learning both the relationship between 
CS1 and CS2, and between CS2 and food. A note in Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) supplementary 
materials suggests that rats given this training, in a pilot study, did not initially make 
magazine responses when presented with CS1 (the tone) alone. However, when they removed 
the light (CS2) from the conditioning chamber, rats responded as one would expect following 
this type of training procedure. Blaisdell and his colleagues (Blaisdell, Leising, Stahlman, & 
Waldmann, 2009) suggested that the rats in the pilot study did not respond to CS1, as they 
had learnt a chain of events, which required CS1 to cause CS2, and in turn CS2 to cause the 
delivery of food. According to this conception of events, CS1 does not directly predict food, 
but instead its relationship with food is mediated by CS2. Thus, if CS1 is not seen to produce 
CS2, then the causal chain has been broken and food might no longer be expected. However, 
if the source of CS2 (i.e., the light bulb) is removed from the chamber, then there can be no 
direct challenge to the causal chain by observing the unlit bulb and so CS1 should elicit 
responding for food.  
 This exact prediction, that the presence of the un-illuminated light was breaking the 
causal chain and thus resulting in a lack of responding, was tested using essentially the same 
sensory preconditioning/causal chain procedure as already described (Blaisdell et al., 2009). 
They observed that rats did indeed respond more to CS1 when the bulb used to display CS2 
was removed from the chamber. This was cited as evidence consistent with the idea that rats 
represented the relationship between events in a causal fashion, and so were sensitive to the 
difference between the explicit absence of a cue (un-illuminated light) and lack of 
35 
 
information about a cue (light removed from the chamber). However, Blaisdell et al. (2009) 
did note that the results might also be due to a context change due to the removal of the light 
from the chamber. Further work using patterning procedures (Fast & Blaisdell, 2011) has also 
been interpreted as consistent with the idea that rats are sensitive to the ambiguity resulting 
from the absence of information when the light is removed from the chamber.  
 Although this account of rat behaviour might be appealing, Morgan’s canon suggests 
that simpler alternatives should be considered. This is precisely what Dwyer and Burgess 
(2011) did with relation to these results. Dwyer and Burgess simulated the formal associative 
theories described by Pearce (1994), Harris (2006) and Wagner (2003), to Fast and 
Blaisdell’s (2011) data. All of these formal accounts were able to produce the same pattern of 
results observed by Fast and Blaisdell if it was assumed that an unilluminated bulb was a cue 
that could enter into the learning process and subsequently control responding. That said, as 
discussed previously (Section 1.2.1), the mere fact that associative accounts are not directly 
inconsistent with a particular result is not a direct demonstration that the associative account 
is to be preferred. More complex cognitive accounts remain, at least, tenable until directly 
invalidated by experimental evidence.  
 As noted at the beginning of this subsection, sensory preconditioning is a long 
established effect within the associative learning literature (e.g., Brogden (1939), who 
reported the effect in dogs). The fact that a response elicited to CS2 also becomes elicited by 
CS1, even though CS1 is never directly paired with the motivationally significant event, is of 
particular theoretical interest, as it speaks directly to general theoretical accounts of the 
associative structures produced by learning. Numerous alternative explanations have been 
advanced for the phenomenon, such as an elemental associative chain, or a configural 
representation of CS1 and CS2 becoming linked to the reinforcer (see, for example, 
Iordanova, Good, & Honey, 2011; Rescorla & Cunningham, 1978). Whether the effect is due 
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to elemental or configural representations is still a topic of debate, but for the moment I will 
focus on a principle underlying both of these accounts: that of stimulus substitution (Pavlov, 
1927). This is the basic idea that one stimulus is substituted for another as a result of learning 
an association between them. That is, CS1 elicits the same CR as CS2 due to the association 
between CS1 and CS2. In an elemental account, CS1 will evoke a memory of CS2, which in 
turn activates a memory of the reinforcer. In a configural account, the presentation of CS1 
will evoke a memory of the compound cue CS12, which in turn is associated with the 
reinforcer. The indirectly activated memory is thought to be the same as the directly activated 
memory. The predictions made by stimulus substitution are in fact the same predictions made 
by the causal account of behaviour, but for different reasons. The causal account predicts the 
response to the two events to be similar due to a causal relationship between them, that is, the 
reinforcer occurs because of the preceding stimuli. The stimulus substitution account, 
however, argues that it is due to the presentation of one stimulus activating a memory of the 
other.  
Although Blaisdell and his colleagues’ argument is perhaps somewhat contentious 
given the volume of sensory preconditioning studies that have found effect without 
manipulating the access to the source of CS2 (e.g., Rescorla, 1980; Rizley & Rescorla, 1972; 
Ward-Robinson & Hall, 1996), it remains possible that animals might represent events within 
their environment in a manner that is beyond associative analyses. Indeed, Hall (1990) has 
suggested that sensory preconditioning might involve a process of deductive reasoning. He 
argued that during a sensory preconditioning procedure a rat might learn a set of propositions 
(i.e., that noise causes food, and food causes illness, therefore a relationship is formed 
between noise and illness). However, sensory preconditioning still occurs when stimuli are 
presented simultaneously (Rescorla & Cunningham, 1978), and simultaneous presentation 
may even produce larger preconditioning effects than subsequent presentation (Rescorla, 
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1980). On one reading, the success of simultaneous presentation in producing sensory 
preconditioning might seem inconsistent with a propositional account, as causes must occur 
before their effects. In contrast, an advantage for simultaneous presentation can be explained 
by an associative analysis, such as Wagner’s (1981) SOP, whereby both the CSs are activated 
into the A1 state at the same time, creating a strong association (Brandon, Vogel, & Wagner, 
2003). Thus, when one CS is presented after simultaneous training, it evokes the memory of 
the other CS (thus, CS1 can excite the representation of CS2 and vice versa). Alternatively, 
with simultaneous presentation, it is possible that the animal does not form a representation 
of each of the stimuli, but that it forms a representation of the compound (i.e., stimulus CS12, 
rather than CS1 and CS2 (Rescorla, 1981). As each element shares properties with the 
compound, then either element might activate, thus supporting generalisation between them. 
All this said, a propositional account can easily be defended by arguing that, while causes 
must precede effects in the world, the perception of cause and effect might occur 
simultaneously if the interval between them is very brief. Consider, for example, the situation 
where blowing on a wind instrument causes a sound to be produced and the causal action of 
blowing is essentially simultaneous with the sound that it produced. 
Propositional and stimulus substitution make the same prediction about the nature of 
the CR. However, other associative accounts, such as mediated conditioning, are possible. 
Wagner’s (1981) SOP states that when a CS is in the A2 state it cannot enter into an 
excitatory association with other stimulus. However, Holland (1983) provided evidence that 
violated this assumption: after pairing a CS with food, pairing the same CS with illness 
results in an aversion to the food. Holland suggested that this finding reflected the fact that 
the CS associatively evoked a memory of food, and this evoked memory became associated 
with illness by a process of mediated conditioning (see also, Hall, 1996; Lin & Honey, 2011). 
This separation of direct conditioning, that results when memories are directly activated by 
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stimuli in the environment, from mediated conditioning, which is based upon associatively 
retrieved memories, allows that the two forms of conditioning might be dissociated. In 
particular, it allows that while direct conditioning might result in the development of one set 
of conditioning responses, mediated conditioning might result a different set. 
Thus, while some associative accounts, the causal-chain analysis, and the idea that 
sensory preconditioning is based upon deductive reasoning, all predict that sensory 
preconditioning will adhere to a strict principle of stimulus substitution, the mediated 
conditioning account does not. The experimental work reported in Chapter 4 examines the 
relative merits of these distinct theoretic accounts of sensory preconditioning.  
1.5. Summary 
The study of animal intelligence began in the late 19
th
 Century, when Darwin (1871) 
suggested that humans have evolved from simpler organisms through a process of natural 
selection. This idea of an evolutionary continuum provided one reason for the similarities and 
differences between human and non-human minds to be of scientific interest. Some 
comparative psychologists argue that non-human animals have complex methods of 
representing the environment, similar to humans (Blaisdell et al., 2006). Meanwhile, other 
theorists have put forward the idea that animals represent the environment using much 
simpler mechanisms, by forming connections between the representations of stimuli, and 
between responses and stimuli (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981). The 
overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate further the nature of cognition in rats in three 
experimental contexts (causal learning scenarios, causal binding procedures, and sensory 
preconditioning).  
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Chapter 2: Causal reasoning 
2.1. Introduction 
 Chapter 1 introduced the idea that animals other than humans may possess the ability 
to reason about the relations between causes and effects. Blaisdell et al. (2006) presented 
evidence from rats, that was consistent with causal model theory. However, an alternative 
explanation for the results was suggested by Dwyer et al. (2009), whose experiments 
revealed that lever pressing interferes with magazine activity. So, the more a rat presses a 
lever, the less likely it is to investigate the food well. This idea of response competition does 
not, in itself, directly invalidate the claim that rats might be capable of causal reasoning. To 
return to the human scenario described in Section 1.2. (Clayton & Dickinson, 2006), the fact 
that a person cannot both turn on a sprinkler and remove their washing at the same time, does 
not mean that they are unaware that there is no need to bring in their washing (because the 
sprinkler is wetting the windows and not rain). Thus, response competition may be obscuring 
any behaviour consistent with causal model theory.  
The analysis presented by Blaisdell et al. (2006), and by causal model theory more 
generally, suggests that the pattern of results that they observed should not be restricted to 
cases where the alternative cause is a response that is made by the rats. Returning to the 
example considered earlier, whether a person turns the sprinkler on themselves or merely 
observes its operation, the knowledge that there is a cause for wet windows other than rain 
should be sufficient to determine their behaviour. Leising et al. (2008) found that presenting a 
novel external alternative cue (C – a tone) prior to the target stimulus (B) during test failed to 
modulate performance to B. On the basis of these results, they argued that novel interventions 
(i.e., lever pressing) might have a special significance in understanding causal relations, and 
might quickly become established as alternative causes and modulate performance 
accordingly, while external cues would not automatically have such special significance. 
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They did, however, allow the possibility that external stimuli might well modulate responding 
if rats received training with them as an alternative cause of the target stimulus. Following on 
from previous analyses of causal reasoning (Waldmann, Cheng, Hagmayer & Blaisdell, 2008; 
Woodward, 2003), they stated that: “Arbitrary nonaction events can be established as 
independent, deterministic causes if the strong contingency and the independence of the 
cause with the effect becomes apparent, such as through learning” (Leising et al., 2008, p. 
516). This idea, that an external stimulus that is established as a cause of some target event 
through learning might play the role of an alternative cause in a reasoning model, is 
interesting for two reasons: first, it represents an untested prediction regarding the ability of 
rats to engage in causal reasoning; and second, in comparison to pressing a lever, an external 
stimulus does not require an animal to be in a particular place and it should produce 
comparatively little response competition.  
 The primary aim of the experiments in Chapter 2 is to reduce any effect that response 
competition might have in the experimental design used by Blaisdell et al. (2006) where the 
critical contrast is between rats given one of two training conditions: common-cause (B ← A 
 F) or causal-chain (B  A  F). The attempt to reduce response competition will be 
approached in three ways: 1. In Experiments 1 and 3, a CS will be trained as an alternative 
cause, rather than a lever press, such that the rats do not have to interact with the alternative 
cause to produce the critical stimulus, B. 2. In Experiments 1 and 2, once the rats had pressed 
the lever, it was withdrawn, so that they could not continue pressing the lever during the 
critical auditory stimulus. In Experiment 2, the rats received training with an alternative cause 
(e.g., lever pressing followed by the auditory stimulus) which might reduce the tendency for 
lever pressing to interfere with magazine activity while enhancing its potential to serve as an 
alternative cause of the auditory stimulus.  
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2.2. Experiment 1  
2.2.1. Introduction 
 In Experiment 1, I examined whether an environmental stimulus that had been trained 
as an alternative observed cause (cf. Leising et al., 2008) would affect performance to the test 
stimulus (i.e., B) in the way that lever pressing (LP) does, as predicted by causal model 
theory. The design of Experiment 1 is depicted in Figure 2.1, and incorporates the critical 
conditions employed by Blaisdell et al. (2006). Thus, rats received either common-cause 
training (i.e., AB, Afood; e.g., toneclicker, tonefood) or causal-chain training (i.e., 
BA, Afood; e.g., clickertone, tonefood); and both forms of training were 
supplemented by additional training trials intended to create an alternative observed cause 
(i.e., CB; e.g., lightclicker). All rats then received three types of test trials: LPB, 
CB, and B alone. The LPB trials test the prediction that when the actions of an animal 
provide an alternative cause for the presentation of B, then this will reduce the tendency of B 
to elicit magazine activity in the common-cause condition, but not in the causal-chain 
condition. Unlike in previous experiments of this type, each time the lever was pressed, it was 
withdrawn from the chamber as B was presented. This arrangement means that the lever 
would not be present at the same time as the tendency for the rats to approach the food 
magazine was being assessed (which will hopefully reduce the potential for responding on 
the lever to interfere with magazine-directed behaviour). The CB trials test whether an 
environmental stimulus, previously trained as a signal for B, would act as an alternative cause 
in the manner predicted by causal model theory. That is, there should be less magazine 
approach during B when it followed C in rats given common-cause training than in those 
given causal-chain training. The B alone trials assess the baseline levels of responding 
elicited by B.  
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2.2.2. Method 
Subjects. All experimental procedures in this thesis were conducted in accordance 
with the UK Animals Scientific Procedures Act 1986. Thirty-two experimentally-naïve male 
hooded Lister rats (Rattus norvegicus) were maintained at 85% to 90% of their free feeding 
weights (range: 304g – 339g, mean: 320g), by restricting the amount of food that they 
received in their home cages. The rats (obtained from Harlan, Bicester, UK) were housed in 
pairs in a room that was illuminated between 0800 and 2000, where they had unrestricted 
access to water. 
Apparatus. Eight standard operant chambers (Med Associates Inc., St Albans, VT, 
USA) were used (L × W × H = 30 × 25 × 20cm). Each chamber consisted of two aluminium 
walls and two clear Perspex walls, with a clear Perspex ceiling and a floor constructed from 
0.5cm diameter stainless steel rods, spaced at 1.5cm intervals from centre-to-centre. Each 
enclosure contained a ventilation fan, and this provided a constant background noise. The 
chamber was dimly lit by a 28-V, 100mA shielded house light mounted 2cm from the ceiling 
on one aluminium wall. Adjacent to the house light was a speaker (mounted outside of the 
chamber) that could deliver a 3000Hz tone and a train of clicks (both at and intensity of 
80dB). These auditory stimuli served as the stimuli, A and B. Dwyer et al. (2009) used these 
stimuli in their Experiment 2, and stimuli from different dimensions in their Experiment 1 (cf. 
Blaisdell et al., 2006). Although the patterns of results were quite different in the two papers, 
in neither case did the nature of the stimuli interact with the results that were observed. At the 
centre of the opposite wall (also aluminium) a food well was positioned close to the floor of 
the chamber. An infrared photo-detector, positioned across the entrance to the food well, was 
interrogated every 0.01s. Each time this interrogation revealed that the photo-detector had  
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Figure 2.1. Schematics for the experimental designs. A and B were auditory stimuli (tone and 
buzzer), C and D were visual stimuli (left and right light), F is a food pellet, LP (in 
Experiment 1) is a lever press, LPN is the novel lever, LPT is a lever that has been paired 
with B, and  refers to the absence of a programmed event. 
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been interrupted (upon entry of the rat to the food well) a nosepoke was recorded; and the 
next occasion on which a nosepoke could be recorded was once the detector had returned to 
its uninterrupted state and was interrupted again. A retractable lever, located 4cm to the right 
of the food well and 6cm above the floor of the chamber, was used; and a localized light 
mounted on the wall directly above the right lever served as the alternative cause (C). The 
chambers were controlled, and the data recorded, by a PC running MED-PC software (Med 
Associates Inc.). 
Procedure. On the first day of training, food pellets were delivered to the food well on 
a VT-60s schedule (range: 30 – 90s). On the next four days, rats received training designed to 
establish parts of the causal models depicted in Figure 2.1. On each of days 2 and 3, rats 
received pairings of stimulus A (clicker or tone; counterbalanced within group) with stimulus 
B (tone or clicker; as determined by the identity of A). In the common-cause group, stimulus 
A immediately preceded B (i.e., AB), whereas in the causal-chain group, stimulus B 
immediately preceded A (i.e., BA). Trials on which stimulus C (i.e., the right light) was 
paired with stimulus B (i.e., CB) were intermixed with the AB trials (for the common-
cause group) or BA trials (for the causal-chain group). Each session consisted of four 
CB trials and eight AB trials or BA trials. On each of days 4 and 5, rats received 8 
trials on which A was immediately followed by the delivery of a food pellet (i.e., Afood). 
The stimuli (A, B and C) were each 10s; and the mean ITI (offset to onset) was 190s (range: 
100 – 280s).  
On day 6, rats received a single session in which there were three types of test trial: 
LPB, CB, and B alone. There were four presentations of each trial type, which occurred 
in a random order (with the constraint that there was one trial of each type in every block of 
three trials), and according to the same schedule as during training (i.e., mean =190s; range: 
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100 – 280s). In this case, the interval was between the offset of B, and the onset of the next 
trial. The results were pooled across test trials on this single test day for the purpose of 
statistical analysis to reduce trial-by-trial variability in responding (cf. Kutlu & Schmajuk, 
2012). On LPB trials, once the designated interval had elapsed, the lever was inserted into 
the chamber and remained extended until pressed. At this point, B was presented and the 
lever was withdrawn, to prevent further lever presses occurring during B and reduce the 
competition with magazine responding (cf. Dwyer et al., 2009). CB trials were the same as 
during training. B alone trials consisted of the presentation of B in the absence of any other 
programmed events. The duration of B on all trial types was 10s. The primary behavioural 
measure was the mean numbers of nosepokes per trial in the presence of A (during training) 
and B (during testing). The pattern of results observed using this measure did not differ 
appreciably from those seen when the duration of nosepokes was used as the measure of 
performance. The mean number of nosepokes per trial during the 10s periods without any 
programmed stimuli that preceded each trial during training and testing was also recorded.  
2.2.3. Results 
The mean numbers of nosepoke responses per trial during the two Afood sessions 
are shown in Table 2.1. Inspection of this table reveals that responding was similar in the 
common-cause and causal-chain groups, and that in both groups the mean levels of 
responding during the 10s periods that immediately preceded A were lower than during A. 
ANOVA confirmed that there was no effect of group, F < 1, there was an effect of period 
(i.e., before A versus during A; F(1, 30) = 43.23, MSE = 39.37, p < .001), and there was no 
interaction between these factors, F < 1. Table 2.1 also shows the overall levels of 
nosepoking during the 10s periods that preceded the test trials. Statistical analysis confirms, 
what inspection of this table suggests, that these rates were similar in the two groups, t < 1. 
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Table 2.1: Experiments 1, 2 and 3: Mean number of nosepokes per trial during training with 
A (both in the 10s before and 10s during A); and background levels of nosepoking during the 
tests that were conducted in extinction (these are reported as responses per 10s period). 
 
 Experiment 1     
Training    Test 
Group Pre-A During-A  Pre-CS 
Chain 10.9 20.1  2.0 
Common 11.3 22.2  2.1 
     
Experiment 2     
Training    Test 
Group Pre-A During-A  Pre-CS 
Chain 14.5 22.4  2.7 
Common 14.6 20.6  2.7 
     
Experiment 3     
Training    Test 
Group Pre-A During-A  Pre-CS 
Chain 9.4 14.2  1.5 
Common 10.8 19.8  1.8 
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The critical results from Experiment 1, the levels of nokepoking during B, minus pre-trial 
responding, are shown in Figure 2.2. First consider the influence of the lever press on  
responding during stimulus B. Examination of Figure 2.2 suggests that, irrespective of 
whether the rats had received common-cause or causal-chain training, the level of responding 
during B was greater when it was presented alone than when it immediately followed a lever 
press. Now consider the consequences of providing an alternative trained cause (C) for 
stimulus B. Examination of Figure 2.2 reveals a tendency for the level of responding during 
B to be greater when it was presented alone than when it immediately followed C. However, 
this tendency was, if anything, more evident in the causal-chain group than the common-
cause group. This pattern of results is inconsistent with the predictions of causal model 
theory.  
The results were subjected to ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of training 
group (common-cause vs. causal-chain) and a within-subjects factor of test trial type (LPB, 
CB, and B alone). This confirmed that there was no main effect of training type, F < 1, but 
that there was an effect of trial type, F(2, 60) = 5.95, MSE = 16.46, p = .004, that did not 
interact with training group, F < 1. Analysis of simple main effects showed that responding 
on B alone trials was greater than on LPB trials, F(1, 30) = 10.64, MSE = 36.83, p =.003; 
but there was no difference in responding either between the B alone trials and the CB 
trials, F(1, 30) = 2.80, MSE = 33.72, p = .104, or between the CB trials and the LPB 
trials, F(1, 30) = 3.59, MSE = 28.22, p = .068.
2
 
 
 
                                                                
2
 There were never any significant effects in the post-CS period (cf. Blaisdell et al. 2006), indeed, responding in 
this period was typically no higher than in the absence of any stimuli. Thus these data will not be considered 
further here. 
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Figure 2.2. Experiment 1. Mean number of nosepokes per trial (minus pre-CS nosepokes) 
during the test with stimulus B as a function of training (common-cause or causal-chain) and 
test trial (CB, alternative cause; B alone; and LPB, novel LP) 
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2.2.4. Discussion 
The effects of presenting an external stimulus as a trained alternative cause of B are 
difficult to assess conclusively because responding on the CB trials lay between the levels 
of responding on LPB and B alone trials without being significantly different from either 
of them. That said, there was no suggestion that any trend towards lower responding on CB 
trials was stronger in the common-cause group as would be predicted by causal model theory. 
Indeed, any tendency for the light to interfere with magazine activity to stimulus B could also 
reflect response competition. For example, it seems entirely plausible to suppose that the light 
elicits an orienting response, and some vestige of this response interferes with magazine 
activity during the presentation of B (cf. Dwyer, et al., 2009). This issue will be returned to, 
and a better control will be provided in Experiment 3.  
The fact that the lever press intervention manipulation had an equivalent effect on 
magazine responding during B in the two training conditions is inconsistent with the 
predictions of causal model theory, and with the results reported by Blaisdell et al. (2006). 
However, these results are consistent with those reported by Dwyer et al. (2009). Although 
the lever was not physically present during the critical stimuli, it is certainly possible that 
both its initial presentation and subsequent removal would elicit a strong orienting response. 
In addition, as has been have noted before (see Dwyer et al., 2009), a single lever press is 
merely the discrete endpoint of approach to, and contact with, the lever and so the ability of a 
lever press to interfere with other responses would extend beyond the time of the lever press 
itself. Thus, withdrawing the lever did not appear to eliminate response competition. Other 
manipulations of the lever will be considered in Experiment 2.  
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2.3. Experiment 2 
2.3.1. Introduction 
In Experiment 1, withdrawing the lever from the chamber as B was presented 
appeared to be insufficient, on its own, to eliminate response competition. One possible 
reason for this it that both the lever, and its removal upon being pressed, are novel and thus 
might elicit a large amount of orienting and other unconditioned behaviours. An obvious way 
to reduce such unconditioned behaviours is to simply familiarise the rats with the lever prior 
to test. However, presenting the lever without consequence could also reduce its tendency to 
be considered an alternative cause. Therefore, in Experiment 2, stimulus B was presented 
after each lever press. This should help to establish lever pressing as an independent 
alternative cause of B, while reducing its tendency to provoke competing behaviours based 
on its novelty.  
Figure 2.1 shows the full design adopted in Experiment 2. During the first stage of 
training, rats either received common-cause training (i.e., AB, Afood) or causal-chain 
training (i.e., BA, Afood). Both forms of training were supplemented by additional trials 
in which a lever was inserted into the box. When the lever was pressed, it was retracted, and 
stimulus B was presented for 10s. At test, responding to B following either a press on the 
trained lever (LPT), or on a novel lever (LPN), was compared to responding on trials where B 
appeared alone. According to the causal analysis LPT should only influence responding in the 
common cause condition; and this influence should be at least as marked as for the untrained 
lever, LPN, which had not been trained as an independent cause. However, according to an 
analysis based upon competing responses alone, LPT should not interfere with responding to 
B; while LPN will do so to the extent that it is treated as entirely different to LPT. 
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2.3.2. Method 
Subjects and Apparatus. Experiment 2 was conducted with two replications, each 
consisting of 32 experimentally-naïve male hooded Lister rats that were sourced and 
maintained in the same way as previously described. The mean free-feeding weight was 246g 
(range: 222-320g) for the first replication, while for the second replication the mean was 
340g (range: 274-397g). Rats were trained in the same operant chambers as previously 
described.  
Procedure. Magazine training was conducted in the same way as described above. On 
each of the next 2 days, rats were presented with four presentations of the lever and 8 pairings 
of A and B. The common-cause group were given presentations of A that were immediately 
followed by B, whereas the causal-chain group were given B immediately followed by A. On 
lever presentation trials, the lever was inserted into the box and remained extended until it 
was pressed, whereupon it was withdrawn and stimulus B was presented. The trained lever 
was counterbalanced within groups, with half of the rats in each group receiving the lever to 
the left of the magazine, and the remainder receiving the lever to the right of it. A and B were 
counterbalanced in the same manner as previously and were both 10s long. On each of 
training days 4 and 5, rats received 8 trials where stimulus A was followed by the delivery of 
a food pellet. The mean ITI during training (offset to onset of trials) was 190s, and ranged 
from 100 – 280s. On day 6, rats received one test session with the trial types shown in Figure 
2.1 (LPTB, LPNB, and B alone). Trials were presented randomly (with the constraint 
that one trial of each type occurred in every 3-trial block), four times each, at an ITI matched 
to that of the training. On lever trials, the lever was inserted into the box and a lever press 
resulted in its retraction and the presentation of B. B alone trials consisted of the presentation 
of B in the absence of a lever or other programmed external stimulus. 
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2.3.3. Results and Discussion 
 The data from the two replications were combined for presentational purposes; but it 
should be noted that the critical statistical effects was the same in both replications when 
analysed separately. Training sessions two and three required animals to press a lever, 
without receiving a reinforcer for doing so. Under these conditions, it was unsurprising that 
some rats failed to complete these sessions, and thus were removed from the analysis. This 
left 28 rats in the causal-chain group and 25 in the common-cause. Table 2.1 shows 
responding during the critical stimuli in the final stage of training (AF). Both groups 
nosepoked more frequently during A than in the pre-CS period. ANOVA confirmed that there 
was an effect of time period, F(1, 51) = 48.17, MSE = 38.18, p < .001, no effect of group (F 
< 1), but an interaction between these factors, F(1, 51) = 4.04, MSE = 38.18, p = .114, 
indicating a higher rate of responding to A in the causal chain group. Table 2.1 also presents 
mean pre-trial responding in the test phase, where again there was no difference between the 
groups, t < 1.  
Figure 2.3 presents the frequency of nosepoke responding during the critical stimuli at 
test, minus the pre-trial responses. Inspection of this figure suggests that rats in the common-
cause group responded at higher rates than those in the causal-chain group, but that in neither 
training group was there a tendency for responses to be lower on trials where B occurred after 
a lever press than on trials where B was presented alone. ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of training group, F(1, 51) = 5.60, MSE = 6.44, p = .022, no effect of test trial type and 
no interaction between these factors, Fs < 1. The effect of group is inconsistent with that 
observed during training, and the basis for the difference is not immediately clear. An  
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Figure 2.3. Experiment 2. Mean number of nosepokes per trial (minus pre-CS nosepokes) 
during the test with stimulus B as a function of training (common-cause or causal-chain) and 
test trial (LPT  B, C  B, LPN  B). 
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analysis including replication as a factor revealed no effect of replication, and no interactions 
involving it (Fs < 1). 
The 95% confidence intervals for the B minus pre-trial response scores did not 
include zero in any of the conditions in either group. That is, in all test conditions rats were 
approaching the magazine during B at a higher level than they were during the pre-trial 
period. Therefore, the absence of any effects of trial type does not reflect a general failure to 
respond. In contrast to both Experiment 1 and Dwyer et al. (2009), responding to B was not 
significantly reduced when it followed a lever press (either when the lever was novel or 
trained). Thus, exposure to a lever prior to test appears only to have attenuated response 
competition in a nonspecific way, which presumably reflects a process of generalization 
between the two levers or the responses that they prompt. Most importantly, even though rats 
had received training whereby a lever press resulted in the presentation of stimulus B, which 
should enhance its tendency to be treated as an alternative cause of B, lever pressing failed to 
modulate responding to B as predicted by the causal account. 
2.4. Experiment 3 
2.4.1. Introduction 
As noted in the discussion of Experiment 1, the design of that experiment meant that 
the effect of an alternative trained cause was compared to a condition where no external 
stimulus was presented before responding to the critical test stimulus was assessed. A more 
adequate assessment of the effect of an alternative trained cause (C), and one that controls for 
the general consequences of stimulus presentation (e.g., orienting responses), should involve 
a comparison with an equivalent stimulus that has not been trained as an alternative cause 
(D). Under such circumstances, one might be more sensitive to any genuine effect that 
pairing C with B has on subsequent responding to B. The experimental design adopted in 
Experiment 3 is depicted in Figure 2.1. During the first stage of training, rats either received 
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common-cause training (i.e., AB, Afood) or causal-chain training (i.e., BA, Afood). 
Both forms of training were supplemented by additional training trials intended to create an 
alternative observed cause (i.e., CB) and a control stimulus (D alone) that was not an 
alternative cause. All rats then received two types of test trials: CB and DB. The 
questions of interest were whether C and D would have a different effect on responding to B 
during the test, and whether any such effect interacts with the nature of training (common-
cause or causal-chain).  
2.4.2. Method 
Subjects and Apparatus. Experiment 3 was conducted as two replications each using 32 
experimentally-naïve male hooded Lister rats. The rats were obtained from the same source 
and maintained in the same way as those described in Experiment 1. The mean free feeding 
weight of the first replication was 321g, with a range of 305-344g, and in the second 
replication, a mean of 316g and a range of 290-336g. Rats were trained in the same operant 
chambers as Experiment 1, with the exception that the light above the left lever (that was in 
other respects equivalent to that above the right lever) was also employed.  
 Procedure. On the first day of training, rats were trained to collect food pellets from 
the food well in the same way as Experiment 1. On days 2 and 3, they received three types of 
trial in a pseudo-random sequence. Group common-cause received the following trials types: 
AB (8 trials per session), CB (4 trials per session) and D alone (4 trials per session); and 
group causal-chain received the same set and number of trials with the exception that the 8 
AB trials were replaced with 8 BA trials. For both groups, the identity of the auditory 
stimulus (tone or clicker) that served as A or B was counterbalanced, and the identity of the 
visual stimulus (left or right light) that served as C or D was also counterbalanced in the 
subgroups created by the previous counterbalancing operation. On days 4 and 5, rats received 
presentations of A that were followed immediately by the delivery of food. On day 6, rats 
56 
 
received four presentations of two types of trial: CB and DB. These trials were presented 
in a pseudo-random sequence. The mean ITI during training and testing was 190s (range: 
100-280s). 
2.4.3. Results and Discussion. 
The data from both replications were analysed together for presentational purposes. 
Table 2.1 shows the training data during the Afood days. It is apparent that responding 
during A is higher than during the 10s period before A for both groups. This was supported 
by an ANOVA, showing a main effect of time period, F(1, 62) = 45.16, MSE = 37.81, p < 
.001 , but no effect of group, and no interaction between these factors, Fs < 1. Table 2.1 also 
shows the overall levels of nosepoking during the 10s periods that preceded CS presentation 
on test, which did not differ between groups, t(62) = 1.11, p = .271. 
Figure 2.4 displays the mean nosepoking frequencies (less pre-CS responding) during 
stimulus B on trials on which it was preceded by the alternative cause (C) and the control 
stimulus (D) as a factor of training group (common-cause vs. causal-chain). In contrast to the 
predictions of causal model theory, responding to B was higher following the alternative 
cause (C) than the unpaired control stimulus (D) in the common-cause group, with this trend 
reversed in the causal-chain group. ANOVA confirmed that there were no main effects of the 
type of stimulus preceding B or training group, Fs < 1. There was an interaction between 
these two factors, F(1, 62)=6.06, MSE=7.45, p=.017. Responding to B, as a function of the 
preceding stimulus type (C or D), differed significantly in the common-cause group, F(1, 31) 
= 4.65, MSE = 8.06, p = .039, but not in the causal-chain group, F(1, 31) = 1.67, MSE = 6.84, 
p = .207. A combined analysis of the two experiments that included replication as a factor 
revealed no effect of this factor or interactions involving it (Fs < 1). 
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Figure 2.4. Experiment 3. Mean number of nosepokes per trial (minus pre-CS nosepokes) 
during the test with stimulus B as a function of training (common-cause or causal-chain) and 
test trial (CB and DB).  
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The results observed here were unexpected on the basis of causal model theory, 
indeed, they were the exact reverse of prediction derived from it. Possible explanations for 
these intriguing results are considered in the General Discussion (Section 2.5). For now it is 
sufficient to note that they provide no support for the idea that rats create causal models from 
the training that they received in Experiment 3; and this cannot be due to a failure of the rats 
to learn about C and D during training because these stimuli did modulate responding to B. 
2.5. General Discussion 
Blaisdell et al. (2006) reported that when rats are given training where one cue (A) 
separately predicts two outcomes (i.e., AB and Afood; common-cause training) they 
approached the magazine when B was presented during a subsequent test. Moreover, 
responding to B was modulated by the manner in which it was presented: it was lower when 
B occurred after a lever press performed by the rat than when B occurred alone. This 
modulation of responding to B was not seen in various control conditions (e.g., when initial 
training established a chain of associations: BA and Afood). These results were 
interpreted as providing support for the idea that the rats might have encoded a simple causal 
model of the training situation, wherein A was the common-cause of two separate events (B 
and food). Possession of this model would normally licence the inference that B had been 
generated by its usual cause (A), and that A would thus have also caused food to be 
delivered. This inference would not hold if there was an alternative cause for B (in this case 
the lever press). The modulation of responding to B, as a function of whether it was produced 
by a rat’s own actions or not, was taken as evidence that magazine behaviour was under the 
control of causal inference mechanisms (and in particular, the mechanisms described by 
causal model theory). 
Although this pattern of results has been replicated by the laboratory in which it was 
first reported (Leising et al., 2008), direct replications of their procedures in the Cardiff 
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University laboratory have failed to reveal the original pattern of results (Dwyer et al., 2009). 
Instead, Dwyer et al. (2009) consistently found that irrespective of the training that rats 
received (common-cause, causal chain or direct conditioning) responding to B was lower 
when it followed a lever press. Moreover, Dwyer et al. (2009) also observed (across 
experimental conditions) a reciprocal relationship between nosepoking to B and lever 
pressing – a relationship that suggests interference between these two forms of response. 
Thus, these previous results suggest that it is not necessary to invoke causal reasoning 
mechanisms to explain the rats’ behaviour – a simpler account in terms of the competition 
between responses is also possible (see Morgan, 1894). Unfortunately, neither Blaisdell et al. 
(2006) nor Leising et al. (2008) reported the levels of lever pressing during the critical 
stimulus B (in all experimental conditions), thereby preventing an assessment of the potential 
role of response competition in their data. Thus, while considerations of parsimony support 
adopting the simpler explanation of the overall pattern of results, it remained possible that the 
response competition in our previous experiments had simply obscured any behaviour that 
was under the control of causal reasoning mechanisms. Therefore, the current series of 
experiments was performed to examine whether evidence could be found that was consistent 
with causal reasoning in rats in situations that might expected to reduce response competition. 
Experiment 1 examined the effect of presenting an external stimulus that had been 
trained as an independent predictor or cause of the critical test stimulus, B, and by removing 
the lever from the chamber once it had been pressed. The response to B was lower when it 
followed the lever press than when it was presented alone, but again this effect was observed 
irrespective of the training that the rats had received (common-cause or causal-chain). 
Responding to B was not significantly affected by the presentation of a trained external 
cause, C, although there was at least some suggestion of a decrement in responding. 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that training the rats with the lever as an independent cause of B, 
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prior to test, abolished the influence of lever pressing on nosepoking during B. Taken 
together, Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that responding to B was only affected by lever 
pressing when the rats experienced levers for the first time in the test session. Experiment 3 
examined nosepoking to B as a function of whether it followed an external cue, C, that had 
previously predicted B, or a control external stimulus, D, that had not. Responding to B was 
modulated by whether it followed C or D, and this interacted with training condition. 
However, the form of this interaction was the opposite to that predicted by causal model 
theory: in rats given common-cause training responding to B was higher when it followed a 
trained alternative cause, C, than the control stimulus, D, and this effect was not seen in the 
causal-chain control condition. The implications of these results will be discussed further in 
the General Discussion (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 3: Causal binding in rats: Timing from an action or external event 
3.1. Introduction 
 The results in Chapter 2 suggest that rats are unable to form and use causal models in 
a manner consistent with causal model theory. One possible explanation of this finding is that 
rats do not represent cause and effect relations in the same manner as humans. However, it is 
also possible that rats can represent cause and effect, but do not use that knowledge to reason 
in the same manner as humans. As discussed in Section 1.3, in humans, actions are more 
likely to be imbued with a causal status than are external stimuli, and it has been argued that 
this difference results in actions and outcomes appearing to share greater temporal contiguity 
than external stimuli and outcomes. In the context of animal cognition, it has also been 
argued that actions and external stimuli have a different causal status (Leising, et al., 2008; 
but see, Burgess, Dwyer, & Honey, 2012). However, there have been no attempts to examine 
whether the perception of time in animals is influenced by whether the referent is a response 
or an external stimulus. This is a theoretically interesting issue, not least because according to 
theoretical analyses of timing behaviour, actions and external stimuli are merely treated as 
markers for the beginning of the interval. For instance, two prominent models of timing, 
Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET, Gibbon, 1977) and Learning to Time Theory (LeT, 
Machado, 1997) state that timing behaviour results from a series of processes that occur after 
a time marker which are generated irrespective of whether this marker is an instrumental 
response or an observed stimulus (for a review, see Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000).  
 In three experiments, the timing behaviour of rats was examined using a peak 
procedure in which either an action or an external stimulus served as the temporal referent. In 
this procedure, a referent was presented and then after t s food was delivered. The question of 
primary interest here was whether timing behaviour, as evident by a peak in responding at or 
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around t s after the referent, was influenced by whether the referent was an action or an 
external stimulus. An effect analogous to causal binding would be evident if the peak 
occurred closer in time to the action (e.g., t s – n s) than to the external stimulus (e.g., t s). 
3.2. Experiments 4-6 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Experiments 4 and 5 used a within-subjects procedure to assess timing from an action 
(a lever press, LP) and an external stimulus (an auditory conditioned stimulus, CS). The 
interval between these two separately presented referents and the delivery of food was 5s. 
During the course of training and testing, nonreinforced trials were included in which the 
action and stimulus occurred, but no food was presented. These trials allow the accuracy of 
timing to be assessed in the absence of the effects of the presentation of food on behaviour. 
The design of Experiment 6 allowed a replication of the results observed in Experiments 4 
and 5 under conditions in which one could assess whether instrumental performance was 
outcome or goal directed. On the one hand, if the rats are representing the outcome as the 
product of their actions (i.e., lever pressing is goal directed), then there are grounds for 
anticipating that timing should be influenced by a process of causal binding. On the other 
hand, if the rats are not representing the outcome in such a fashion (i.e., behaviour is 
habitual), then evidence of causal binding would not be expected. 
To assess timing behaviour under conditions in which such goal directedness could be 
determined, rats were initially presented with two levers that were each paired with a 
different outcome (e.g., left leverfood and right leversucrose); and two CSs that were 
also paired with different outcomes (e.g., tonefood and buzzsucrose). Once the timing 
behaviour in the two conditions (LP and CS) had been established, the rats were sated on one 
of the outcomes (e.g., food) and then given a test in which the two responses were made 
available in an extinction test. If instrumental responding was related to the outcomes with 
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which the different responses were paired, then rats should be less likely to perform the 
response that was paired with the now devalued outcome (left lever) than the response that 
was paired with the outcome that retains its value (right lever; e.g., Adams & Dickinson, 
1981; Dickinson, 1985). 
3.2.2. Method 
Subjects. Each experiment used experimentally naïve male hooded Lister rats (Rattus 
norvegicus) obtained from Harlan, Bicester, UK. They were maintained between 85-90% of 
their free-feeding weights (Experiment 4, N = 12; mean = 346g, range: 330-360g; Experiment 
5, N = 16; mean = 399g, range: 350g-428g; Experiment 6, N = 16: mean = 356g, range: 328-
385g) by feeding them a small quantity of food at the end of each day. Rats were housed in 
pairs in a room illuminated between the hours of 0800 and 2000.  
Apparatus. The same operant chambers were used as those described in Chapter 2. 
The CSs were a 2s train of clicks (10 Hz: Experiment 4), a 0.5s tone (3000 Hz; Experiment 
5), and a 0.8s buzz (100 Hz) or tone (3000 Hz, Experiment 6), and all CSs were presented at 
an intensity of 80dB. At the centre of the opposite wall (also aluminium), there was a food 
well positioned close to the floor of the chamber. This delivered food pellets and sucrose 
solution. An infrared photo-detector, positioned across the entrance to the food well, was 
interrogated every 0.01s. Each time this interrogation revealed that the photo-detector had 
been interrupted (upon entry of the rat to the food well) a nosepoke was recorded, along with 
its duration; and the next occasion on which a nosepoke could be recorded was once the 
detector had returned to it uninterrupted state and was interrupted again. The chambers were 
equipped with two 2cm long retractable levers, located 4cm to the right/left of the food well 
and 6cm above the floor of the chamber. The left lever was used in Experiments 4 and 5, and 
both levers were used in Experiment 6. The chambers were controlled and the data recorded 
by a PC running MED-PC software (Med Associates Inc.). The pre-feed boxes used for the 
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devaluation stage in Experiment 6 consisted of 32 × 15 × 12cm (L × W × H) white acrylic 
walls and floor, with a stainless steel wire lid. Food pellets were provided in small plastic 
trays; and 20% sucrose was made accessible through drinking spouts made of stainless steel, 
attached to 50ml cylinders. The amount consumed was assessed by weighing the bottles and 
trays before and after the pre-feed.  
Procedure. On the first day of Experiments 4 and 5, rats received a pretraining session 
in which there were 20 trials on which the left lever was inserted into the chamber until it was 
pressed at which point it was retracted and a sucrose pellet was delivered; and 20 trials on 
which the offset of a 2s train of clicks (in Experiment 4), or the offset of a 0.5s tone (in 
Experiment 5), was paired with sucrose pellet. There was an interval of 60 – 80s (mean 70s) 
from the offset of one stimulus (CS or LP) and the onset of the next; and the order of trials 
was random with the constraint that there were no more than 2 trials of the same type in 
succession. In Experiment 6, rats were given the same form of pretraining with both levers 
(left and right), and two 0.8s auditory CSs (tone and buzz). The length of the CSs was 
increased from that in Experiment 5 to ensure that the rats could distinguish between them. 
Pressing one lever and the presentation of one CS was paired with the delivery food, and 
pressing the remaining lever and the presentation of the other CS were paired with 0.02ml of 
20% sucrose solution. The design was fully counterbalanced. The session consisted of 40 
trials, 10 of each trial type. The scheduling of trials types was otherwise the same as in 
Experiments 4 and 5. 
On the next 24 days in Experiment 4 and 29 days in Experiment 5, rats received 
training trials where the LP and CS were followed by food after an interval of 5 s. There were 
18 of each of the two trial types in each session; and an additional 2 nonreinforced LP and CS 
trials with the distribution of trials arranged in the same way as in the pretraining session. 
Food well activity was collected in 1s bins. In Experiment 6, rats received 34 days of training 
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in which the two CSs and LPs continued to be presented 9 times and paired with their 
designated outcomes after a 5s interval. One additional trial with each CS and LP was 
presented without reinforcement. The interval between stimuli was matched to that of the 
previous two experiments.  
Test. The final stage in Experiments 4 and 5 involved test sessions that included an 
additional 4 non-reinforced LP and CS test trials. These test sessions consisted of 14 
reinforced LP and CS trials, and 6 non-reinforced LP and CS trials. In Experiment 6 the test 
sessions consisted of 7 reinforced trials with the two LPs and CSs, and 3 nonreinforced trials 
with these LPs and CSs. The food-well entries on the non-reinforced trials were used to 
assess timing accuracy. Other details of these sessions were the same as for the immediately 
preceding stage of training.  
Devaluation (Experiment 6). The within-subjects devaluation procedure involved 
presenting the rats with 30 minutes access to either food pellets or 20% sucrose solution in 
the pre-feeding boxes described above over two devaluation days. For half the cohort, food 
pellets were presented on the first day, and sucrose solution on the next; and for the rest, this 
order was reversed. After the rats were given access to either food pellets or sucrose solution 
for 30min, they were transferred to the operant chambers. During the test sessions, rats 
received separate access to the left lever and the right lever for 30s on 8 separate trials, with a 
variable ITI of 20 – 60s, and a mean of 40s. The frequency of lever presses during these 30s 
periods was recorded. Between the first and the second devaluation days, the rats were given 
another day of training (40 trials, 10 of each type). 
Measures of timing. The rate of food well entries during successive 1s bins following 
the response and the offset of the stimulus were recorded. The location of the peak response 
rate was assessed using a Gaussian curve fitting procedure (Lejeune & Wearden, 2006). The 
resulting Gaussian curves were used to determine the accuracy of timing through the width of 
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the curve (i.e., the variance of the data). At the end of the Gaussian curve, responding should 
return to baseline levels. This can be fitted with a Gaussian curve and linear ramp function. 
The formula used is shown below (taken from Buhusi, Sasaki & Meck, 2002) where t is the 
current time, t0 is the peak time, b is the estimate of precision of timing (variance), a + d is 
the estimate of peak rate of response, and c is the slope of the tail. 
A × exp (– .5 × [(t – t0) / b]
2
) + c × (t – t0) + d 
For the present purposes, the most critical parameter is t, the peak time of responding, as this 
represents the best estimate of interval between events. The accuracy of the curve fit (R
2
) was 
taken to ensure the function accurately fits the data, and any rats not revealing a good curve 
fit were removed from subsequent analyses (where R
2
 < .80). 
3.2.3. Results 
Experiment 4. Figure 3.1 displays the mean rates of responding during the 20s period 
following the LP and CS for the final 18 non-reinforced trials for each condition (i.e., the 
final 3 sessions of testing). All rats were included in the analysis, as each had a curve fit 
accuracy (R
2
) of greater than .80. Inspection of this figure shows that in both conditions, 
responding peaks at around 5 – 6s, and then declines to a stable, low level by about 12s. It is 
also evident that the level of responding is initially higher after the CS than after the LP (see 
also Experiment 6). As will be seen in Experiment 5, in which a shorter CS was used, this 
effect appears to reflect the fact that the 2s presentation of the CS is less likely to compete 
with food well activity than is a lever press. The mean peak responding, along with the R
2
 
and variance in each condition, are presented in the top panel of Table 3.1. Inspection of this 
table shows that the peak response time for the CS trials are similar to the LP trials, t(11) = 
1.630, p = .131, SEM = .274; and that the variability of the timing peak is smaller for LP 
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Figure 3.1. Experiment 4. Mean duration (in seconds) of nosepoke responding during the 20s 
periods that followed the nonreinforced CS and LP trials (presented as 0s on the x axis). The 
fitted curves show the mean curve fits in the CS and LP conditions. 
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trials than CS trials, t(11) = 3.188, p = .009, SEM = .312. The final variable is the mean R
2
 
value for each trial type. Inspection of these values in Table 3.1 indicates that the accuracy of 
the curve fits is generally better for the CS than the LP trials. This was confirmed using a t-
test, t(11) = 6.145, p < .001, SEM = .008.  
Standard null hypothesis tests of the sort performed above do not assess the extent to 
which the absence of a significant effect is consistent with a genuine absence of any 
difference in the population being sampled from. Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey and Iverson 
(2009) outline a method for using Bayesian analysis which does allow the evaluation of the 
degree to which the evidence actually supports the null hypothesis. In short, this analysis 
method provides a value known as the Bayes factor which is the odds ratio relating the 
probability of the null hypothesis being true to the probability that the alternative hypothesis 
is true, given the observed data. To evaluate the relative probability of the null and alternate 
hypotheses requires that both be specified.  Although there are a range of different 
possibilities for each of these, Rouder et al. (2009) suggest that as a default, the null should 
be specified as it is in standard null hypothesis testing, and the alternate hypothesis (for a t-
test situation) be set as 1 standard deviation between condition means.  These default 
specifications were used for the Bayes analyses reported throughout this thesis. The Bayes 
factor can be interpreted as providing support for the null hypothesis if its value is greater 
than 3, the alternative hypothesis if its value is less than 1/3, or insufficient evidence for 
either hypothesis (if its value is between 1/3 and 3). An online calculator 
(http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor) was used for paired designs and the JZS (Jeffrey-Zeller-
Siow) prior, because it makes the fewest assumptions regarding the prior distribution (Rouder 
et al., 2009). The Bayes Factor for the peak time is 1.498, which provides inconclusive  
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Table 3.1. Test Data From Experiments 4 to 6: Mean Peak Responding (s), Curve Fit 
Accuracy (R
2
), and Variance. 
 
 
Trial Type Peak Time (s) R
2
 Variance 
Experiment 4    
    CS- 4.6 (.201) 0.97 (.007) 4.1 (.203) 
    LP- 5.2 (.097) 0.92 (.012) 2.8 (.134) 
Experiment 5    
    CS- 5.3 (.178) 0.93 (.009) 3.49 (.263) 
    LP- 5.2 (.385) 0.92 (.010) 3.33 (.579) 
Experiment 6    
    CS- 4.6 (.404) 0.92 (.012) 4.6 (.639) 
    LP- 5.2 (.299) 0.85 (.019) 3.1 (.313) 
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evidence for either hypothesis. There is certainly no suggestion that the data is consistent 
with a causal binding effect where the peak time was shorter for LP trials. 
Experiment 5. Figure 3.2 shows the combined data from the final 18 test trials (i.e., 3 sessions 
of training). Although these test sessions produced generally accurate curve fits, the 
performance of 5 rats were removed from the analysis because their curve fits revealed an 
accuracy of less than .80. The pattern of timing was very similar in the LP and CS conditions, 
with the only notable difference being that the spread of responding around the mean was 
somewhat smaller in the LP condition. The mean peak of responding, R
2
 and variance of the 
LP and CS trials are presented in the middle panel of Table 3.1. Inspection of these scores 
reveals that there was little difference between the conditions. This description of the results 
is supported by the fact that there were no significant differences in peak responding, t(10) = 
0.064, p = 0.950, SEM = .275, variance, t(10) = 0.209, p = .839, SEM = .538, or R
2
, t(10) = 
1.571, p = .147, SEM = .009.  
As in Experiment 4, a Bayes analysis was run on the non-significant results, and a 
Bayes factor for the peak responding time revealed odds of 4.656, and the variance revealed 
odds of 4.943. This means that, given the observed data, the null hypothesis is over four times 
more likely than the alternative hypothesis – thus supporting the conclusion that timing from 
an action or an external cue does not differ with respect to the peak time or variability of 
responding. However, for R
2
 the evidence for accepting either the null or alternate hypothesis 
is insufficient, with a Bayes factor of 1.282.  
Experiment 6. Figure 3.3 depicts the mean rates of nosepoking following the 
nonreinforced LP and CS trials over the last 5 days of testing, pooled over the two LPs and 
CSs. This number of test days was necessary to produce more accurate curve fits, as there 
were fewer trials per condition in the test session compared to Experiments 4 and 5. The 
scores in Figure 3.3 therefore represent means of 15 non-reinforced trials. Only rats that  
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Figure 3.2. Experiment 5. Mean duration (in seconds) of nosepoke responding during the 20s 
periods that followed the nonreinforced CS and LP trials (presented as 0s on the x axis). The 
fitted curves show the mean curve fits in the CS and LP conditions. 
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Figure 3.3. Experiment 6. Mean duration (in seconds) of nosepoke responding during the 20s 
periods that followed the nonreinforced CS and LP trials (presented as 0s on the x axis). The 
fitted curves show the mean curve fits in the CS and LP conditions. 
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provided an accurate (R
2
 > 0.80) fit for responding to both CSs and both LPs were 
included. This led to the removal of eight rats from the analysis. The results shown in Figure 
3.3 are more similar to those shown in Figure 3.1 than in Figure 3.2. Specifically, during the 
initial seconds after the LP and CS, nosepoking was lower on LP than CS trials. The length of 
the CSs were longer in Experiment 6 than for the CS in Experiment 5, and this might help to 
explain why the pattern of results was more like those seen in Experiment 4 than Experiment 
5. Table 3.1 shows the mean curve fit data. Examination of this table suggests that the peak of 
responding was slightly longer for the LP than the CS condition, and that the variance and R
2
 
are smaller for the LP condition than the CS condition. This description of the results shown 
in the table is supported by t-tests, that revealed no difference between the peak time of 
responding in the LP and CS conditions, t(7) = 2.206, p = .063, SEM = .278, but a smaller 
variance for the LP than the CS condition, t(7) = 3.672, p = .008, SEM = .429, and a smaller 
R
2
 for the LP than the CS condition, t(7) = 4.376, p = .003, SEM = .016. A Bayes analysis 
was run on peak response time data giving a Bayes factor of 0.700. As in Experiment 4, this 
is consistent with the idea that the peak time of responding is not meaningfully longer for LP 
than CS trials (despite the numerical difference) but again, there is no suggestion that the data 
is consistent with a causal binding effect where the peak time was shorter for LP trials. 
 During the devaluation procedure, rats consumed a mean of 6.06g (SEM = 0.324g) of 
food pellets and 5.83g (SEM = 0.648) of sucrose solution. The mean number of lever presses 
during the extinction test for the lever associated with the devalued outcome was 5.00 (SEM 
= 1.899) for the sucrose reinforcer and 9.75 (SEM = 2.938) for pellets. The number of lever 
presses for the non-devalued outcome was 11.00 (SEM = 1.783) for the sucrose reinforcer 
and 19.25 (SEM = 6.129) for pellets. Thus there were lower rates of responding on the lever 
associated with the devalued than the non-devalued outcome, and little difference in this 
devaluation effect depending on which of the outcomes was devalued. ANOVA confirmed 
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that there was an effect of devaluation, F(1, 7) = 8.680, MSE = 55.357, p = .022, no main 
effect of whether the reinforcer was food pellets or sucrose, F(1, 7) = 1.742, MSE = 194.00, p 
= .228, and no interaction between these factors, F(1, 7) = 0.560, MSE = 43.786, p = .479. 
3.2.4. Discussion 
Humans perceive the interval between their actions and a resulting outcome to be 
shorter than the interval between an external stimulus and an outcome (see Haggard et al., 
2002; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). Chapter 3 investigated whether the timing behaviour of 
rats exhibits such a causal binding effect. In each experiment, an action (a lever press) or a 
CS (e.g., a tone) served as the referent for the start of a five-second interval that terminated in 
the delivery of an outcome. Rats were trained, using a peak procedure, until their peak rate of 
responding on non-reinforced probe trials was approximately five seconds. Using this 
procedure, evidence of causal binding would take the form of an earlier peak response time 
on lever press trials than on CS trials. In none of the experiments was this pattern of results 
observed. One potential explanation for the failure of instrumental responding to show 
evidence of causal binding is that lever press actions had become independent of the outcome 
during the extensive training that was required to establish reliable timing behaviour. 
However, in Experiment 6, it was established that causal binding was not observed under 
conditions in which instrumental responding was demonstrably outcome dependent: Satiation 
on one of two outcomes selectively depressed performance of the instrumental response 
associated with that outcome.  
Although these experiments revealed no difference in timing behaviour between 
action and external cues, there is another potential explanation for the results obtained. As 
noted in the method section, the lever was withdrawn from the chamber once pressed. This 
may be acting as a cue for the rats to time from (albeit, this environmental event is under the 
control of the rat). The issue as to whether the rats are timing from their own action, or from 
75 
 
the external cue that this action produces, is worth exploring, as if it is the case that the rats 
are timing from the external cue, this takes away the critical comparison I am looking for in 
these experiments. It should be noted that external cues produced by the action are also 
present in the human studies (e.g., the button returning to its original position; for instance, 
see Haggard et al., 2002). However, in Buehner and Humphrey’s (2009) study, both of the 
conditions involved an action, although the action was only causally relevant in one 
condition. Regardless, if both the lever press and its withdrawal are being used as cues for the 
timing, then the peak response time should reflect the combination of both. That is, the peak 
time should still be shorter in the LP condition (assuming causal binding effects) if the LP has 
any control over the timing of the nose poke response. However, numerically in two of the 
three experiments, the LP trials peak later than the CS trials.  
From a causal model perspective, the fact that lever withdrawal was equivalent to the 
lever press as a cue for the timing of food should not be an issue, because Leising et al. 
(2008) argued that actions are more readily established as causes than external cues. Thus, the 
action of pressing the lever would be expected to control behaviour rather than the 
withdrawal of the lever. Nevertheless, suggestions for how my procedure could be improved 
to control for this possibility are discussed in Section 5.3. 
Causal binding has been attributed to the internal “clock” or pacemaker running faster 
(e.g., see Humphreys & Buehner, 2010). If so, then the extended training used in these 
experiments might allow the rats to compensate for the change in clock speed by learning that 
the food arrived after a larger number of clock pulses in the LP than the CS case, thus 
supporting accurate timing for both.  But the idea that the perceived LP to food interval will 
have more clock pulses than the CS to food interval also has implications of its own – in 
particular that the variability of the response should be higher in the LP case. That is, SET 
(Gibbon, 1977) suggests that the variability of a timing response should increase with its 
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mean value. However, the variability is always numerically less in the LP case, and this 
difference is significant in two of the three experiments. The data collected here are thus not 
consistent with the idea of more frequent pulses during the LP trials. 
Although the results observed in Experiments 4-6 are inconsistent with the possibility 
that rats’ judgments of temporal intervals is subject to a process of causal binding, they are 
consistent with formal models of timing. For example, SET (Gibbon, 1977) and LeT 
(Machado, 1997) both assume (implicitly) that timing will not be influenced by whether the 
temporal referent is an action and external stimulus. Until now, this assumption has not been 
directly assessed, and the novel results presented in this paper provide support for models of 
timing that have been developed and evaluated in the context of studies of animal behaviour. 
The implications of these results will be further discussed in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 4: Sensory preconditioning as a form of reasoning 
4.1. Introduction 
The results of the experiments in Chapters 1 and 2 revealed no evidence supporting 
causal representation or causal reasoning in rats. However, the idea that rats are capable of 
propositional thought pre-dates Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) research. For instance, Hall (1990) 
suggested that sensory preconditioning might be considered to be an example of causal 
cognition (see Section 1.4). There are also associative explanations of sensory 
preconditioning, many of which rely on the principle of stimulus substitution, where 
whatever conditioned behaviours come to be elicited by A, as the result of it being directly 
paired with a US, might well be provoked by B, as the result of it being paired with A. As 
mentioned already (Section 1.4), the elemental chain and configural accounts provide good 
theoretical grounds for supposing that this will be so: either the memory of A or the 
configural memory of AB mediate conditioned the transfer of responding between A and B. 
Here, four experiments are reported that assessed the prediction, derived from both 
propositional accounts and some associative accounts of sensory preconditioning, that there 
should be strict stimulus substitution. The procedure used produces a very robust sensory 
preconditioning effect (Rescorla & Cunningham, 1978). The procedure involves presenting 
rats with two flavour compounds (AB and CD), and then pairing one of the component 
flavours (A), but not the other (C), with injections of the nausea-inducing agent lithium 
chloride (LiCl). The standard outcome of this procedure is that rats will not only be less 
inclined to consume A than C, but they will also be less inclined to consume B than D. 
Although the most widely examined consequence of pairing a flavoured stimulus with LiCl is 
the subsequent reduction in its consumption, there are also reliably observed changes in the 
form of the consummatory response. For example, flavours previously paired with LiCl-
induced illness elicit aversive orofacial behaviours in taste reactivity tests (e.g., Grill & 
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Norgren, 1978; Pelchat, Grill, Rozin, & Jacobs, 1983), suggesting that the test flavour is now 
unpalatable or aversive. In addition, flavours paired with LiCl elicit reduced lick cluster sizes 
(e.g., Baird, John, & Nguyen, 2005; Dwyer, 2009; Dwyer, Boakes, & Hayward, 2008). To 
consider the latter effect in a little more detail, first note that rats ingest fluids in sustained 
runs of licks (clusters) separated by pauses, and the mean number of licks per cluster (lick 
cluster size) is lawfully related to the nature of the solution being consumed: Lick cluster size 
shows a positive, monotonic relationship to the concentration of palatable fluids such as 
sucrose (e.g., Davis & Smith, 1992; Spector, Klumpp, & Kaplan, 1998) and decreases 
monotonically with increasing concentrations of unpalatable quinine solutions (e.g., Hsiao & 
Fan, 1993; Spector & St John, 1998). Moreover, benzodiazepine administration, which is 
thought to enhance hedonic reactions to foods in humans (Haney, Comer, Fischman, & 
Foltin, 1997), enhances lick cluster size (e.g., Higgs & Cooper, 1998). These, and other, 
results suggest that the size of licking clusters is a variable directly related to the palatability 
of the solution being consumed (for a review, see Dwyer, 2012). In this light, the reduction in 
lick cluster size observed in conditioned flavour aversion reinforces the idea from taste 
reactivity studies that pairing a flavour with LiCl-induced illness both reduces its 
consumption and results in the flavour becoming unpalatable.  
A recent review has argued that theoretical analyses of learning must allow for 
separable representations of different aspects of the CS and US – and for manipulations of the 
learning situation to influence which aspects of these CSs and USs become associatively 
linked – if they are to provide a complete account of Pavlovian conditioning (Delamater, 
2012). Notably, the same review also cited lick analysis methods as a key technique in 
addressing dissociable aspects of the US. Thus, this technique was used to understand the 
basis of sensory preconditioning. In the current context, direct flavour-aversion conditioning 
with A should result in both a reduction in consumption of A and a reduction in lick cluster 
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sizes indicating a concurrent reduction in palatability. The prediction of interest here, shared 
by propositional and some associative accounts, is that both of these robust conditioned 
responses of direct conditioning (to A) should also be evident to a flavour (B), that has been 
paired with A in a sensory preconditioning procedure. If it transpires that the prediction is 
accurate, then propositional and some associative accounts gain support; but if not, then other 
accounts for sensory preconditioning will need to be considered (e.g., those based on 
mediated conditioning) that are not constrained to make this prediction.  
4.2. Experiment 7 
4.2.1. Introduction 
The design of Experiment 7 is shown in Table 4.1. All rats first received repeated 
exposure to two flavour compounds, AB and CD, prior to conditioning trials in which flavour 
A was paired with LiCl and flavour C was presented without consequences. The consumption 
of each of the flavours A-D was then examined in separate 1-bottle tests. Throughout the 
training and test phases, the timing of all licks was recorded to allow for the analysis of lick 
cluster sizes. Comparing responding to A and C during test provided the assessment of direct 
conditioning, while comparing B and D provided the assessment of sensory preconditioning. 
On the basis of previous analyses of conditioned flavour aversion, rats should consume less 
of A than C, and also that lick cluster sizes elicited by A will be smaller than those elicited by 
C. As described above, stimulus substitution accounts of sensory preconditioning suggest that 
equivalent effects will be seen with B and D. However, any dissociation between the effects 
of direct conditioning and sensory preconditioning on consumption and lick cluster size 
would be difficult to reconcile with such accounts. 
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Table 4.1. Design of Experiments 7, 8, and 10. 
 
 Pre-training Conditioning Test 
Experiment 7    
 3 × AB, 3 × CD A10ml/kg LiCl, C- A, B, C, D 
    
Experiment 8    
Low 3 × AB, 3 × CD A5ml/kg LiCl,  C- A, B, C, D 
High 3 × AB, 3 × CD A15ml/kg LiCl,  C- A, B, C, D 
    
Experiment 10    
Immediate 3 × AB, 3 × CD A10ml/kg LiCl,  C- A, B, C, D 
Trace 3 × AB, 3 × CD Awater15ml/kg LiCl,  C- A, B, C, D 
 
 
Note: AB and CD represent flavour compounds constructed from the elements (A-D; 
solutions of sucrose, maltodextrin, salt and lemon); “+” represents the intraperitoneal 
administration of 0.15M LiCl, while “-” represents no outcome. Contrasting the responses to 
A and C at test provides an assessment of a direct conditioning, while contrasting B and D 
assesses sensory preconditioning.  
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4.2.2. Method 
Subjects. Twenty-four male Lister hooded rats (Rattus Norvegicus) were obtained 
from Harlan, Bicester, UK for the purposes of the study. Their weights before the beginning 
of the study ranged from 346g to 425g, with a mean weight of 378g. The rats were housed in 
pairs in a room illuminated between the hours of 0800-2000, where they had ad-lib access to 
food and received 60 min access to water per day, approximately 1hr after the experimental 
sessions.  
Apparatus and Stimuli. Rats were trained and tested in eight custom-made drinking 
chambers (Med Associated Inc., St Albans, USA). These were 32 × 15 × 12 cm (L × W × H), 
with steel mesh flooring and with white acrylic walls. Fluids were made accessible through 
drinking spouts made of stainless steel, attached to 50ml cylinders. These could be inserted 
on the left or right hand side of the lid (made of wire mesh). The distance between the holes 
for the bottles was 8cm. Only the left hand side was used for the current studies. A contact 
sensitive lickometer registered the time of each lick to the nearest 0.01s. This was recorded 
by a computer using MED-PC software (Med Associates Inc.). The amount of fluid 
consumed by each rat was measured by weighing the drinking bottle before and after each 
session. The stimuli were solutions of 3% sucrose, 4% maltodextrin, 2% lemon juice and 1% 
salt (all w/w). When presented as simultaneous compounds, the two solutions were mixed so 
as to maintain these concentrations. 
Procedure. All experimental sessions were 10min in duration and there was one 
session on each per. To acclimatise the rats to the experimental apparatus they were given 
one 10-min session with access to water. The following 6 sessions comprised three exposures 
to the pairs of flavour compounds in alternation (AB, CD,… or CD, AB…; see Table 4.1). 
The assignment of stimuli to condition was counterbalanced such that each of sucrose, 
maltodextrin, lemon and salt was used equally often as stimuli A, B, C, or D. In order to 
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minimize unconditioned differences in the responses to stimuli within a test pair (A vs. C for 
direct conditioning, B vs. D for sensory preconditioning) the assignment of solutions to 
conditions was constrained such that a test pair always comprised either sucrose and 
maltodextrin or salt and lemon.  
 On days 7 and 8 rats received access to A (on one day) and C (on the other) in a 
counterbalanced order. Access to A was followed by an intraperitoneal injection of 0.15M 
LiCl (at 10ml/kg bodyweight) and access to C was not. Sessions 9-12 comprised the test 
period where all rats received one exposure to each of the solutions. The solutions were given 
in the order sucrose, maltodextrin, salt and lemon for all rats: Thus, due to the 
counterbalancing of the assignment of solutions to conditions, across animals the order of 
testing was equally often ACBD, ACDB, CABD, CADB, BDAC, BDCA, DBAC, or DBCA. 
Data Analysis. In addition to the consumption data, the mean cluster size for each rat 
was extracted from the record of licks for analysis. A cluster was defined as a set of licks 
each separated by an inter-lick-interval of no more than 0.5s. This criterion is used by Davis 
and his co-workers (e.g., Davis & Perez, 1993; Davis & Smith, 1992) and in the majority of 
our previous studies using lick analysis techniques (Dwyer, 2008, 2009; Dwyer, et al., 2008; 
Dwyer, Lydall, & Hayward, 2011; Lydall, Gilmour, & Dwyer, 2010a, 2010b). Although 
other criteria have been used (e.g., Dwyer, Pincham, Thein, & Harris, 2009; Spector, et al., 
1998), parametric analyses suggest that there is little practical difference between them as 
most pauses greater than 0.5s are also greater than 1s (e.g., Davis & Smith, 1992; Spector, et 
al., 1998). The data from pretraining and aversion conditioning was monitored to ensure that 
all solutions were being consumed, which they were by all rats. These data will not be 
considered further for this or subsequent experiments. Repeated-measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) were used to analyse the test data with factors of aversion condition (i.e., 
whether the stimuli should be subject to an aversion or not: A & B versus C & D) and 
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training type (direct conditioning or sensory preconditioning: A & C versus B & D). All tests 
reported here used a criterion for significance of p = 0.05. 
4.2.3. Results 
Figure 4.1 shows the data from the test sessions (consumption in Panel A and lick 
cluster size in Panel B). Inspection of Panel A suggests that consumption scores were lower 
for A than for C (direct conditioning) and lower for B than for D (sensory preconditioning), 
although the difference was larger for direct than for sensory preconditioning. ANOVA 
conducted on the amount consumed revealed significant effects of aversion condition (A & B 
vs. C & D; F(1, 23) = 50.62, MSE = 16.34, p < .001), training type (i.e., direct vs. sensory 
preconditioning; F(1, 23) = 88.99, MSE = 1.89, p < .001), and an interaction between them 
(F(1, 23) = 34.66, MSE = 8.41, p < .001); but, simple effects analyses revealed that the 
difference in consumption was significant for both the direct conditioning (A vs. C) and 
sensory preconditioning (B vs. D) (F(1, 23) = 112.32, MSE = 9.35, p < .001; and F(1, 23) = 
4.44, MSE = 15.40, p < .05, respectively). 
Inspection of Panel B suggests that while lick cluster sizes for were smaller for A than 
C (direct conditioning), there was little difference in this measure for B and D (sensory 
preconditioning). ANOVA on lick cluster sizes revealed significant effects of aversion 
condition (F(1, 23) = 31.22, MSE = 219.38, p < .001), training type (F(1, 23) = 11.72, MSE = 
98.13, p = .002), and an interaction between them (F(1, 23) = 9.07, MSE = 286.12, p < .01). 
In contrast to the consumption data, simple effects analyses revealed a significant difference 
in lick cluster size between the A and C (F(1, 23) = 69.72, MSE = 128.19, p < .001), but not 
between B and D (F(1, 23) = 1.34, MSE = 377.30, p = .259).  
As was noted in Chapter 3, Bayesian analysis can be used to assess the degree of 
support that a non-significant result gives to the idea that there is a genuine absence of an  
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Figure 4.1. Experiment 7: Mean (+SEM) number of licks per trial (panel A) and lick cluster 
size (panel B) during the test with A and C (direct conditioning) and flavours B and D 
(sensory preconditioning). 
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effect. Therefore, the same technique was applied to the difference between B and D in the 
lick analysis data. The Bayes factor for this comparison was 1.970, which is inconclusive for 
the genuine absence of an effect.  
The fact that differential direct conditioning to A and C was evident as differences in 
both the levels of consumption and cluster size, but sensory preconditioning was only evident 
in the levels of consumption of B and D, represents the type of dissociation that casts doubt 
on standard accounts of sensory preconditioning which rely on stimulus substitution. 
However, while the difference in the size of lick clusters for B and D did not approach 
statistical significance, they were numerically smaller for B than for D and the Bayes analysis 
did not provide support for accepting the null or alternative hypothesis. Thus, before 
considering the theoretical implications of the results of Experiment 7, I sought to replicate 
and extend them. 
4.3. Experiment 8 
4.3.1. Introduction 
The design of Experiment 8, shown in Table 4.1, was equivalent to Experiment 7 with 
the exception that one group of rats received 5ml/kg (Low) and the other received 15ml/kg of 
LiCl (High). If the dissociation observed in Experiment 7 reflects a genuine difference 
between direct conditioning and sensory preconditioning then it should be observed across a 
range of conditioning parameters. However, if this dissociation reflects the fact that weak 
conditioning per se does not change lick cluster size then increasing the dose of LiCl might 
reveal a sensory preconditioning effect using the lick cluster size measure, while decreasing 
the dose of LiCl might serve to reduce the modulation of lick cluster size by direct 
conditioning. 
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4.3.2. Method 
Forty-eight male Lister hooded rats, obtained from the same source as in Experiment 
7 and maintained in the same fashion, were used. Their weights before the beginning of the 
study ranged from 333-389g, with a mean weight of 358g. All details of the stimuli, 
apparatus, and procedure were the same as in Experiment 7 with the following exceptions: A 
total of sixteen experimental chambers were used and half of the rats (Group Low US) 
received 0.15M LiCl at 5ml/kg while the remainder (Group High US) received 0.15M LiCl at 
15ml/kg. 
4.3.3. Results 
Figure 4.2 shows the data from the test sessions (consumption in Panel A and lick 
cluster size in Panel B). As in Experiment 7, inspection of Panel A suggests that both direct 
conditioning (involving A and C) and sensory preconditioning (involving B and D) was 
evident in different levels of consumption; and that this was the case in both groups Low and 
High. The consumption data was assessed using a mixed ANOVA with a between-subject 
factor of LiCl strength and within-subject factors of aversion condition (i.e., whether 
subjected to an aversion or not: A & B versus C & D) and training type (direct conditioning 
or sensory preconditioning: A & C versus B & D). This analysis revealed no significant effect 
of LiCl strength (F(1, 46) = 2.62, MSE = 10.35, p = .112) or interactions involving this factor 
(Fs < 1). There were significant effects of aversion condition (F(1, 46) = 53.35, MSE = 
13.83, p < .001), training type (F(1, 46) = 32.11, MSE = 6.44, p < .001), and an interaction 
between them (F(1, 46) = 21.16, MSE = 10.78, p < .001). In order to assess this interaction, 
the data from direct conditioning and sensory preconditioning were subject to separate 2-way 
ANOVAs examining the factors of aversion condition and LiCl strength. In the case of direct 
conditioning, consumption of A was lower than C (F(1, 46) = 67.39, MSE = 13.25, p < .001), 
but there was no effect of LiCl strength (F(1, 46) = 2.77, MSE = 7.23, p = .114), nor any  
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Figure 4.2. Experiment 8: Mean (+SEM) number of licks per trial (panel A) and lick cluster 
size (panel B) during the test with flavours A and C (direct conditioning) and B and D 
(sensory preconditioning). Half of the rats received 5ml/kg LiCl and the remainder received 
15ml/kg LiCl. 
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interaction between these factors (F < 1). Similarly, the sensory preconditioning data revealed 
that consumption of B was less than that of D (F(1, 46) = 6.41, MSE = 11.36, p = .015), there 
was no effect of LiCl strength (F < 1), nor any interaction between these factors (F(1, 46) = 
1.23, MSE = 11.36, p = .274). That is, as in Experiment 7, both direct conditioning and 
sensory preconditioning resulted in lower consumption of A than C and of B than D; albeit 
that the former, directly conditioned effect was larger than the latter sensory preconditioning 
effect. 
Inspection of Panel B suggests that lick cluster sizes was lower for A than C (direct 
conditioning), but did not differ between B and D (sensory preconditioning); and this 
dissociation was evident in both groups High and Low. Again, there was no significant effect 
of LiCl strength (F < 1) or interactions involving this factor (largest F(1, 46) = 3.02, MSE = 
203.33, p = .089, for the 3-way interaction between LiCl strength, aversion condition, and 
training type). There were significant effects of aversion condition (F(1, 46) = 36.56, MSE = 
171.12, p < .001), training type (F(1, 46) = 16.12, MSE = 138.77, p < .001), and an 
interaction between them (F(1, 46) = 20.86, MSE = 203.33, p < .001). As with the 
consumption data, this interaction was assessed by examining separate 2-way ANOVAs for 
the direct conditioning and sensory preconditioning data. In the direct conditioning case lick 
cluster sizes were lower for A than C (F(1, 46) = 48.36, MSE = 217.12, p < .001), but there 
was no effect of LiCl strength (F < 1), nor a significant interaction between these factors 
(F(1, 46) = 3.87, MSE = 217.12, p = .055). In contrast, the sensory preconditioning data 
revealed no suggestion difference between B and D (F < 1), as well as no effect of LiCl 
strength (F(1, 46) = 1.05, MSE = 302.92, p = .312), nor an interaction between these factors 
(F < 1). 
As in the previous experiment, a Bayes analysis was run on the B versus D lick 
analysis data. The Bayes factor for the 5ml LiCl group and 15ml LiCl group was 3.321 and 
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6.251 respectively, and thereby provide support for the idea that there genuinely is no effect 
of sensory preconditioning on lick cluster size.  
4.4. Experiment 9 
4.4.1. Introduction 
Experiments 7 and 8 both produced the same dissociation: direct conditioning resulted 
in reduced consumption and lick cluster size for A compared to the C, but sensory 
preconditioning only resulted in reduced consumption of the B compared to D while leaving 
lick cluster sizes unaffected. Taken at face value, this pattern of results represents a direct 
challenge to standard accounts of sensory preconditioning that require strict stimulus 
substitution. However, it remains the case that in both of Experiments 7 and 8, sensory 
preconditioning produced smaller changes in consumption than did direct conditioning. Thus, 
it is possible that the same dissociation would be observed with direct conditioning 
parameters that produced weak conditioning. For example, it is possible that B is less able to 
activate A (or AB) or the US representation than is the direct application of A, and that it is 
these differences that produce the dissociation of the two measures of performance. 
Therefore, in Experiment 9, the intensity of the flavours and the US were manipulated in a 
direct conditioning procedure, to assess whether or not this would produce the same 
dissociation between the measures of performance that was evident in the sensory 
preconditioning procedure in Experiments 7 and 8. 
All rats received four stimuli, A-D, that were arranged as two pairs (A, C and B, D). 
One of the pairs (A and C – “Normal” concentration) was presented at the same 
concentrations as in Experiments 7 and 8, and for the second pair of stimuli (B and D – 
Dilute concentration) these concentrations were halved. For half of the rats (those in group 
High) received 5ml/kg of LiCl (i.e., the weakest dose examined in Experiments 7 and 8) after 
A and B, and the remainder (those in group Low) received 2.5ml/kg of LiCl. C and D were  
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Table 4.2. Design of Experiment 9. 
 
 
Normal flavour 
concentration 
Dilute flavour 
concentration 
Test 
High  A5ml/kg LiCl, C- B5ml/kg LiCl, D- 
A, B, C, D 
Low A2.5ml/kg LiCl, C- B2.5ml/kg LiCl, D- 
 
Note: A-D represent flavours (solutions of sucrose, maltodextrin, salt and lemon). The 
concentrations at which these flavours were presented (Normal: A and C – equal to 
Experiments 8 and 9; or Dilute: B and D – half the concentrations used previously) was 
manipulated within subjects, and the amount of LiCl (High: 5ml/kg; or Low: 2.5ml/kg) was 
manipulated between subjects. For all rats, A and B were paired with LiCl and C and D were 
not. Contrasting the responses to A and C at test provides an assessment of conditioning with 
CSs of the same concentration as in Experiments 7 and 8, while contrasting B and D assesses 
condition with stimuli of lower concentrations than used previously.  
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not paired with LiCl (see Table 4.2 for the full design). If the finding that sensory 
preconditioning was evident as a difference in consumption, but not lick cluster size, simply 
reflected the fact that the presentation of B was only able to weakly activate A (or AB), then 
the same dissociation should be observed for B in Experiment 9. Similarly, if the dissociation 
reflected the fact that B was only able to weakly activate the representation of LiCl, then it 
should also be evident in group Low. Of course, if the dissociations reflected a combination 
of these two factors, then the dissociation should be most apparent for stimulus B in group 
Low. 
4.4.2. Method 
Thirty-two male Lister hooded rats, obtained from the same source as in Experiments 
7 and 8 and maintained in the same fashion, were used. Their weights before the beginning of 
the study ranged from 314-348g, with a mean weight of 331g. The details of the stimuli, 
apparatus, and procedure are as in the previous experiments except as outlined below.  
To acclimatize the rats to the experimental apparatus they were given two 10min 
sessions with access to water. The four following sessions comprised one exposure to each of 
stimuli A, B, C, and D. The assignment of stimuli to condition was counterbalanced such that 
each of sucrose, maltodextrin, lemon and salt was used equally often as stimuli A, B, C, or D. 
Stimuli A and C were presented at the same concentrations as in Experiments 7 and 8 while 
stimuli B and D were presented at half these concentrations. In order to minimize 
unconditioned differences in the responses to stimuli within a test pair (A vs. C and B vs. D) 
the assignment of solutions to conditions was constrained such that a test pair always 
comprised either sucrose and maltodextrin or salt and lemon. Moreover, for an equal number 
of rats in the counterbalanced subgroups, training sessions with the four stimuli were 
presented in the following orders: ABCD, BADC, CDAB, or DCBA. Half of the rats (group  
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Figure 4.3. Experiment 9: Mean (+SEM) number of licks per trial (panel A) and lick cluster 
size (panel B) during the test with flavours A and C (high concentration) and B and D (low 
concentration). Half of the rats received 2.5ml/kg LiCl and the remainder received 5ml/kg 
LiCl. 
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High) received 0.15M LiCl at 5ml/kg while the remainder (group Low) received 0.15M LiCl 
at 2.5ml/kg after the designated stimuli, A and B. Sessions 7-10 comprised the test period 
where all rats received one exposure to each of the solutions. The solutions were given in the 
order sucrose, maltodextrin, salt and lemon for all rats. Thus, due to the counterbalancing of 
the assignment of solutions to conditions, across animals the order of testing was equally 
often ACBD, ACDB, CABD, CADB, BDAC, BDCA, DBAC, or DBCA. 
4.4.3. Results 
Figure 4.3 shows the data from the test sessions (consumption in Panel A and lick 
cluster size in Panel B). Inspection of Panel A suggests that consumption of the flavours 
paired LiCl (i.e., A and B) was lower than the flavours that were not (i.e., C and D) regardless 
of LiCl intensity. Inspection of Panel B suggests that lick cluster sizes were also lower for A 
and B than for C and D regardless of LiCl intensity. The test data were analysed as in 
Experiment 8: Namely, a mixed ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of the amount of 
LiCl and within-subjects factors of stimulus type, and flavour concentration, followed by 
separate 2-way ANOVAs examining the factors of stimulus type and amount of LiCl for 
groups High and Low. 
The analysis of consumption revealed significant effects of amount of LiCl (F(1, 30) 
= 10.85, MSE = 5.76, p = .003) and stimulus type (F(1, 30) = 105.68, MSE = 11.19, p < 
.001). There were no other significant main effects or interactions (largest F(1, 30) = 2.40, 
MSE = 14.10, p = .131, for the interaction between flavour concentration and stimulus type). 
To provide a direct parallel with the analysis of Experiment 8, the data from A and C (the 
stimuli presented at the same concentrations as Experiments 7 and 8) and from B and D (the 
stimuli presented at half of these concentrations) were subject to separate 2-way ANOVAs 
examining the factors of stimulus type and amount of LiCl. For A and C, consumption of the 
A was lower than that of the C (F(1, 30) = 60.19, MSE = 13.43, p < .001) and consumption 
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was lower in group High than in group Low (F(1, 30) = 12.90, MSE = 4.35, p = .001). There 
was no interaction between these factors (F < 1). For B and D, consumption of B was lower 
than D (F(1, 30) = 34.41, MSE = 11.86, p < .001); but there was no effect of group (F(1, 30) 
= 2.82, MSE = 8.85, p = .103), nor a significant interaction (F(1, 30) = 3.11, MSE = 11.86, p 
= .088). That is, as in the previous experiments, direct conditioning resulted in lower 
consumption of flavours that were directly paired with LiCl than those that were not, even 
when the concentrations of the flavours and LiCl were reduced from the values used in 
Experiments 7 and 8. 
The analysis of the lick cluster data revealed significant effects of the amount of LiCl 
(F(1, 30) = 12.28, MSE = 249.13, p = .001), stimulus type (F(1, 30) = 32.26, MSE = 230.26, 
p < .001), and flavour concentration (F(1, 30) = 11.32, MSE = 91.43, p = .002). There was 
also a significant interaction between flavour concentration and stimulus type (F(1, 30) = 
4..56, MSE = 129.33, p = .041). There were no other significant interactions (Fs < 1). As 
before, the scores for A and C, and for B and D, were subject to separate 2-way ANOVAs 
examining the factors of stimulus type and amount of LiCl. For A and C, lick cluster sizes 
were lower for A than C (F(1, 30) = 33.15, MSE = 184.10, p < .001) and lower in group High 
than group Low (F(1, 30) = 8.42, MSE = 154.85, p = .007). There was no interaction between 
these factors (F < 1). For B and D, lick cluster sizes were lower for B than D (F(1, 30) = 
10.92, MSE = 175.49, p = .002), and lower in group High than in group Low (F(1, 30) = 
9.55, MSE = 185.71, p = .004). There was no interaction between these factors (F(1, 30) = 
1.31, MSE = 175.49, p = .262). That is, as in the previous experiments, direct conditioning 
resulted in lower lick cluster sizes for flavours paired with LiCl than those that were not, even 
when the concentrations of the flavours and LiCl had been reduced from the values used in 
Experiments 7 and 8. Whereas Experiment 9 was intended to vary the strength of activation 
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of the CS, Experiment 10 attempted to manipulate the nature of the CS memory that was 
present immediately prior to the US. 
4.5. Experiment 10 
4.5.1. Introduction 
One difference between direct conditioning and sensory preconditioning is that in 
direct conditioning the stimulus paired with the US and the test stimulus are both directly 
activated by a CS presented to the animals, whereas in sensory preconditioning the test 
stimulus was not presented during conditioning. In terms of Wagner’s SOP model (1981), the 
critical stimuli during direct conditioning are in the A1 state during training and test, whereas 
sensory preconditioning involves evoked (i.e., A2) memories of stimuli. However, in some 
forms of conditioning, notably trace conditioning, the CS might be expected to decay, at least 
partially, into the A2 state. If the difference between direct and SPC, in terms of their effects 
on lick cluster size, is related to the representational state (A1 vs. A2) of the CS, then a 
simple manipulation should influence the dissociations observed. The design of Experiment 
10, shown in Table 4.1, was equivalent to Experiment 7 with the exception that one group of 
rats received the LiCl US immediately following the presentation of solution A (group 
Immediate) while rats in the other group were allowed to consume water during an interval of 
30 minutes that was left between presentation of A and the administration of LiCl (group 
Trace).  
4.5.2. Method 
Thirty-two male Lister hooded rats were used. These rats were obtained from the 
same source as in Experiment 7 and maintained in the same manner. Their weights before the 
study began ranged from 345g-461g, with a mean of 404g. All details of the stimuli, 
apparatus, and procedure were the same as described in Experiment 7 with the following  
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Figure 4.4. Experiment 10: Mean (+SEM) number of licks per trial (panel A) and lick cluster 
size (panel B) during the test with flavours A and C (direct conditioning) and B and D 
(sensory preconditioning). Half of the rats received LiCl immediately after presentation of A 
during the training phase and the remainder received LiCl following a 30 min delay. 
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exceptions: Sixteen experimental chambers were used. Half of the rats (group Immediate) 
received LiCl injections immediately after access to A, were replaced in the apparatus, and 
then allowed to consume water for 30 min. The remainder (group Trace) received flavour A, 
followed by access to water for 30 min in the apparatus, before LiCl administration. Once 
these treatments were complete, the rats were taken back to their home cages.  
4.5.3. Results and Discussion 
Figure 4.4 shows the results from the test sessions, with consumption in Panel A and 
lick cluster size in Panel B. As in Experiment 7, inspection of Panel A suggests that both 
direct conditioning (involving A and C) and sensory preconditioning (involving B and D) 
was evident in different levels of consumption; and that this was the case in both groups 
Immediate and Trace. The consumption data was assessed using a mixed ANOVA with a 
between-subject factor of LiCl delivery (immediate or trace) and within-subject factors of 
aversion condition (i.e., A & B versus C & D) and training type (direct conditioning or 
sensory preconditioning: A & C versus B & D). This analysis revealed no significant effect of 
the delay manipulation (F(1, 30) = 2.71, MSE = 13.88, p = .110) or interactions involving 
this factor (Fs < 1). There were significant effects of aversion condition (F(1, 30) = 41.08, 
MSE = 25.68, p < .001), training type (F(1, 30) = 26.59, MSE = 5.09, p < .001), and an 
interaction between them (F(1, 30) = 24.04, MSE = 12.70, p < .001). As in Experiments 8 
and 9, to assess this interaction, the data from direct conditioning and sensory 
preconditioning were subject to separate 2-way ANOVAs examining the factors of aversion 
condition and LiCl delivery. In the case of direct conditioning, consumption of A was lower 
than C (F(1, 30) = 71.11, MSE = 17.54, p < .001), but there was no effect of LiCl delivery 
(F(1, 30) = 2.90, MSE = 10.52, p = .099), nor any interaction between these factors (F < 1). 
Similarly, the sensory preconditioning data revealed that consumption of B was less than of 
D (F(1, 30) = 5.41, MSE = 20.83, p = .027), there was no effect of LiCl delivery (F(1, 30) = 
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1.169, MSE = 8.45, p = .288), nor any interaction between these factors (F < 1). That is, as in 
Experiment 7, both direct conditioning and sensory preconditioning resulted in lower 
consumption of A than C and of B than D; albeit that the former, directly conditioned effect 
was larger than the latter sensory preconditioning effect. 
Inspection of Panel B indicates that lick cluster sizes were lower for A than C (direct 
conditioning), but did not differ between B and D (sensory preconditioning); and this 
dissociation was evident in both groups Immediate and Trace. Moreover, the difference 
between A and C was smaller in group Trace than in group Immediate. Again, there was no 
significant effect of LiCl delivery (F < 1) or interactions involving this factor (largest F(1, 
30) = 3.23, MSE = 334.99, p = .082, for the interaction between delay and aversion 
condition). There were significant effects of aversion condition (F(1, 30) = 11.85, MSE = 
334.99, p = .002), training type (F(1, 30) = 8.97, MSE = 227.28, p = .005), and an interaction 
between them (F(1, 30) = 42.19, MSE = 200.22, p < .001). As with the consumption data, 
this interaction was assessed by examining separate 2-way ANOVAs for the direct 
conditioning and sensory preconditioning data. In the direct conditioning case, lick cluster 
sizes were smaller for A than C (F(1, 30) = 47.73, MSE = 251.39, p < .001), but there was no 
effect of LiCl delivery (F < 1). Critically, there was an interaction between these factors (F(1, 
30) = 4.61, MSE = 251.39, p = .040). Despite this interaction there was a significant 
difference in lick cluster size between A and C in both cases (F(1, 15) = 37.03, MSE = 
278.38, p < .001; and F(1, 15) = 12.70, MSE = 224.41, p = .003, for the Immediate and Trace 
conditions respectively). In contrast, the sensory preconditioning data revealed no suggestion 
of a difference between B and D (F(1, 30) = 1.48, MSE = 283.82, p = .234), as well as no 
effect of LiCl delivery, nor an interaction between these factors (Fs < 1). 
As previously, Bayes analyses were run on the B versus D comparison in both the 
Trace and Immediate conditions. Although, the Trace condition revealed a Bayes factor of 
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2.264, formally providing inconclusive evidence for the absence of a difference between B 
and D, it should be remembered the observed values for B were greater than D, which is the 
opposite of what would be observed if sensory preconditioning reduced lick cluster sizes, 
whereas the Immediate condition revealed a Bayes Factor of 5.015, providing support for the 
absence of an effect.  
Experiment 10 replicated the dissociation between direct conditioning and SPC in 
terms of their impact on consumption scores and lick cluster size; again, direct conditioning 
influenced both measures whereas SPC only influenced consumption. Experiment 10 also 
showed that introducing a trace interval between the CS and US produced a similar 
dissociation in response measures: this manipulation had no impact on consumption scores, 
but it did influence lick cluster size. The origin of the dissociations observed in conditioning 
and SPC will now be considered in greater detail. 
4.6. General Discussion 
 Sensory preconditioning has been central to theoretical analyses of learning in 
nonhuman animals. Here, two type of account of sensory preconditioning were evaluated, 
associative and propositional, that both assume that after exposure to AB, any responses 
established to A will be mirrored in the responses elicited by B. I examined whether the two 
forms of conditioned responses established by direct conditioning to A were reflected in 
responding generated to B through prior exposure to AB. The conditioned responses 
examined were the decreases in consumption and lick cluster size produced by pairing 
flavours with LiCl. In Experiments 7-10, rats consumed less of a flavour that had been 
directly paired with LiCl than of a flavour which had not; and in all four experiments, the lick 
cluster sizes elicited by the flavour that had been paired with LiCl were smaller than those 
elicited by the flavour that had not. This pattern of results was evident across a range of 
flavour concentrations and doses of LiCl. These results are consistent with previous analyses 
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of lick cluster size (e.g., Baird, et al., 2005; Dwyer, 2009; Dwyer, et al., 2008) and confirm 
the fact that directly conditioned flavours produce both avoidance and aversion
3
. In 
Experiments 7, 8 and 10, after exposure to AB, the reduction in consumption in A resulting 
from its pairing with LiCl were also mirrored in the consumption of B. Critically, this SPC 
effect was not accompanied by a change in lick cluster sizes to B in any of the three 
experiments. That is, there was a clear dissociation between the effects of direct conditioning 
and those of SPC: Both produced changes in consumption of the test flavours, but only direct 
conditioning (and not sensory preconditioning) produced a change in lick cluster size.  
 As I have already noted, the dissociation described above is incongruent with 
standard, elemental and configural, accounts of SPC which assume that responses established 
by direct conditioning should transfer to other stimuli through an associative chain or a 
shared, configural representation. However, before completely rejecting these accounts, it is 
worth considering the types of arguments that have been proposed to explain why 
conditioned responses (CR) and unconditioned responses (UR) differ in direct conditioning, 
while maintaining a stimulus substitution framework. Perhaps the two most common 
arguments are that the precise form of a response (either CR or UR) depends upon the nature 
of the stimulus which elicits that response, and that many USs elicit multiple, and sometimes 
opposing, responses (for reviews, see Mackintosh, 1983; Rescorla & Holland, 1982). While 
these ideas can explain some of the discrepancies between CRs and URs, neither can explain 
the differences observed here between directly conditioned responses and those based on 
SPC. For example, Tolman (1932) noted that particular response components, such as 
chewing or licking, would not be seen to diffuse auditory or visual stimuli because such 
stimuli did not provide the stimulus support for those responses (i.e., there was nothing to 
                                                                
3
 All previous studies of licking microstructure in flavour conditioning have used between-
subjects designs, and my results confirm these effects using within-subjects designs. 
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chew or lick). Indeed, when stimuli that were used did support chewing then this response to 
the CS can be observed (e.g., Boakes, Poli, Lockwood, & Goodall, 1978). However, in 
Experiments 7-10, both direct conditioning and SPC were based on the same flavoured 
solutions that were presented in the same way. So, while differences in the response enabling 
features of the CS and US can explain some discrepancies between CRs and URs, such 
differences cannot be used to explain the dissociations that were observed in the Experiments 
7-10.  
 The second potential mechanism that has been used to explain the divergence of CRs 
and URs is the idea of opposing or compensatory responses. According to this analysis, a US 
elicits multiphasic responses and only some of these become linked to the CS. There is 
certainly evidence for such responses in many situations, especially those involving 
pharmacological and aversive stimulation (e.g., Solomon & Corbit, 1974). However, in the 
current situation, according to both the elemental chain and configural accounts, direct and 
SPC is mediated by the same pathway (involving either the memories of A or AB in these 
respective accounts). Consequently, even if LiCl elicited multiphasic responses, there is no 
mechanism – in these accounts – that would allow the directly conditioned stimuli and those 
that gain their behavioural tendencies through SPC to be linked to different aspects of these 
multiphasic responses. In short, while there are explanations of the divergence in the form of 
CRs and URs in direct conditioning that do not require one to abandon the principle of 
stimulus substitution
4
, these explanations cannot account of the divergence observed here 
between SPC and direct conditioning. 
                                                                
4
 It should be noted that it has been concluded that a strict application of stimulus substitution 
is insufficient to explain all aspects of responding following Pavlovian conditioning 
(Mackintosh, 1983; Pearce, 2008; Rescorla & Holland, 1982). 
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A detailed consideration of the basis for the dissociation between responses acquired 
during conditioning and sensory preconditioning will follow in the General Discussion. It is 
sufficient to note here that the analysis that the results of Experiments 7-10 favour is based on 
the general idea that conditioning and sensory preconditioning are based on different 
associative pathways. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
5.1. Summary of Results 
5.1.1. Causal Reasoning 
 Chapter 2 described three experiments in which rats were presented with a series of 
relationships that, it has been argued, should afford the development of different causal 
models: a common-cause model (B ← A → F) or a causal-chain model (B → A → F). 
Experiment 1 revealed that a novel lever press presented at test as an alternative cause of B, 
lowers responding rates compared to B presented alone. However, an external alternative 
cause that has been trained has no effect on the responding to B compared to baseline 
response rates. This pattern of results was evident in both training conditions. Experiment 2 
examined the effect of training a lever press as an alternative cause of the test stimulus, B, 
and this was contrasted with the effect of pressing a novel lever at test. There were no effects 
of either the trained or the untrained lever at test. However, the rate of responding to the 
levers was higher in the common-cause group than the causal-chain group. The final 
experiment using this causal model methodology used solely external cues; that is, they did 
not require the animal to perform any action. A visual cue (C) was trained as the alternative 
cause of B, and this was compared to another visual cue (D) which had been pre-exposed 
during training, but not paired with B. Responding during B was higher following the 
alternative cause (C) than the unpaired control stimulus (D) in the common-cause group, and 
this trend was reversed in the causal-chain group. The theoretical implications of these results 
will be discussed in Section 5.2.1.  
5.1.2. Causal binding 
 Chapter 3 presented a series of experiments using rats’ timing behaviour. Rats were 
trained with an action (a lever press presented on a discrete trial basis) and an auditory cue 
(tone, clicker, or buzzer) which both predicted the outcome of food after a 5s delay. 
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Experiment 4 used a 2s clicker (CS) and a lever press (LP), and it was observed that the peak 
time of responding was the same in the CS condition as the LP condition. The next 
experiment shortened the length of the CS to a 0.5s tone, and again compared responding to 
that following a lever press. This comparison revealed no difference in responding between 
the conditions. The final experiment in Chapter 3 compared two CS conditions with two LP 
conditions, that is, a tone and a buzzer, each with a duration of 0.8s, and a left and right lever 
press. These led to one of two outcomes, food or sucrose solution (i.e., CS1 → food, CS2 → 
sucrose, LP1 → food, LP2 → sucrose). This revealed no differences in the peak rate of 
responding between the conditions. A devaluation procedure was conducted at the end of 
Experiment 6, where rats were presented with each lever separately following prefeeding of 
either food or sucrose solution. The results revealed that rats pressed the lever significantly 
more for the non-devalued substance than the devalued substance (e.g., if pre-fed food, rats 
would be more likely to press the lever corresponding to sucrose solution). These results will 
be further discussed in Section 5.2.2.  
5.1.3. Sensory Preconditioning 
 The final experimental chapter (Chapter 4) investigated sensory preconditioning using 
compound cues. The stimuli were flavoured solutions (e.g., sucrose and lemon), and the 
consumption along with the size of licking clusters were taken as response measures. One of 
these elements (e.g., sucrose) was then given an aversion (lithium chloride, e.g., 10ml/kg), 
and responding to the directly paired stimulus (e.g., sucrose; A) and the indirectly paired 
stimulus (e.g., lemon; B) were compared to controls with no aversion (e.g., maltodextrin and 
salt; C and D). Experiment 7 showed that the directly and indirectly paired stimuli had lower 
consumption rates compared to the control substances. The directly paired stimulus revealed 
the same reduction in responding in the lick cluster size data, but the same effect was not 
observed in the indirectly paired stimulus. This effect was repeated in Experiment 8, which 
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varied the amount of lithium (5ml/kg, 15ml/kg). Experiment 9 used only direct conditioning, 
but varied the concentration of the solutions consumed (high concentration of A and C, low 
concentration of B and D), and the amount of lithium administered (2.5ml/kg or 5ml/kg). 
This experiment found that A was consumed less than C, and B consumed less than D, and 
the same pattern of results in the lick cluster data. The final experiment addressed whether 
there was a difference in responding following immediate or trace conditioning. This used the 
same procedure as Experiment 7, but one group were provided with lithium immediately 
following the stimulus (Group Immediate), and the other 30 minutes after the stimulus 
(Group Trace). The results revealed the standard sensory preconditioning effect for both the 
immediate and trace groups in the consumption data (A consumed less than C, B consumed 
less than D). In the lick cluster data, direct conditioning revealed a decrease in lick cluster 
size of A compared to C for both groups. This difference was larger in Group Immediate. 
Indirect conditioning revealed no difference between B and D in either group. The theoretical 
implications of these results will be discussed further in Section 5.2.3.  
5.2. Theoretical implications 
5.2.1. Causal Reasoning 
 The results of Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 1 provided little evidence that rats were 
engaging in a process of causal reasoning: The effects of intervention were as apparent for 
rats that had received causal-chain training as those given common-cause training; any effects 
were removed by familiarity with the lever, and were not evident with an explicitly trained 
external cause. It is thus appropriate to speculate about other explanations of the effects 
observed, which will be guided by associative analyses. The first step is to consider why, 
according to associative theorising, rats might respond during B at all. In the causal-chain 
condition, the most obvious basis for responding to B is that the presentation of B will 
activate the associative chain BAfood. It should be clear that for rats given common-
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cause training, the basis for responding during B is unlikely to be this associative chain: 
although A will be able to activate food, B should not be so able to activate A, because the 
nature of their pairing (AB) means that any excitatory link from B to A is likely to be 
relatively ineffective (see Wagner, 1981). So, why do rats given this form of training visit the 
food well during B? One obvious possibility is based upon mediated conditioning (Dwyer, 
2003; Holland, 1983, 1990). When A is paired with B, an association will form that will 
allow the associatively provoked memory of B to be active on trials where A is later paired 
with food. This could allow an association for form between the retrieved representation of B 
and food, thus providing a basis for rats to visit the food well during B.  
Given that there are associatively-based accounts to explain why rats given either 
common-cause or causal-chain training visit the food well when B is presented, the question 
then becomes: Why is responding to B affected by what takes place immediately before it? I 
have already considered the possibility of response competition, whereby the tendency to 
interact with whatever preceded B (in particular a novel lever) would be inconsistent with 
producing a magazine response. Other things being equal, this mechanism should have 
equivalent effects regardless of the mechanism supporting the response to B: which is exactly 
what was observed when the lever was novel in Experiment 1, and previously (Dwyer et al., 
2009). In rats that had previously experienced lever presses paired with B, lever pressing did 
not affect responding to B at test (Experiment 2). But, what of the situation in Experiment 3, 
where the presentation of C (that had previously signalled B) and D (which had not) had 
different effects on responding to B depending on whether the rats had received common-
cause or casual chain training? 
Take first the common-cause condition. What is required is an account for why B 
elicits greater responding on trials on which it was preceded by C than when it was preceded 
by D. One possibility is based on the observation that as a result of CB trials, during 
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training, the subsequent presentation of C, at test, will activate the memory of B into the 
same, associatively activated state, as it occupies when it is paired with food on Afood 
trials. This will not be the case when B is preceded by D. This idea receives direct support 
from the results of recent studies which used procedures (i.e., second-order conditioning and 
sensory preconditioning) that are similar to those used in the current experiments. Lin and 
Honey (2011) demonstrated that the associatively and directly activated representations of a 
stimulus are distinct and can be associated with different outcomes (see also Lin & Honey, 
2010). This implies that there will not be perfect generalisation between the associatively and 
directly activated representations of a stimulus, and thus any response elicited by one of these 
will be elicited to only a lesser extent by the other.
5
 Obviously, this associatively-based 
account was developed after the data were collected, and so requires further testing before it 
can be uncritically accepted. That said, it provides an explanation of why animals approach 
the food magazine during the presentation of B at all, and also of why this response to B will 
be modulated by the context in which B appears in some circumstances but not others.  
Although there was no significant difference in responding to B as a function of 
whether it followed C or D in group causal-chain, it is worth briefly considering why the 
analysis described in the preceding paragraph would not also apply here. In the causal-chain 
condition, training should have resulted in the formation of a BA association and an 
                                                                
5
 It might well be asked why similar effects are not seen in Experiment 2, where rats received 
training where a lever press predicted the presentation of the critical stimulus, and thus might 
be expected to evoke its associatively activated representation.  However, in Experiment 3, 
the stimuli (A and C) that might evoke the associative representation of B were both 
externally presented visual cues, and so it would be reasonable to expect good generalisation 
between the representations of B that were elicited by both stimuli.  This will not be the case 
in Experiment 2, where the associatively activated representation of B that was paired with 
food was elicited by an external visual cue (A) while on test B was preceded by a lever press. 
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Afood association; and responding to B at test will involve activation of the associative 
chain BAfood as opposed to the form of mediated learning described in the previous 
paragraph. That is, activation of B by C during test will not mean that it is in the same 
representational state as during training. Moreover during the test, presenting C, but not D, 
should associatively activate the memory of B prior to its occurrence. There is a long history 
of research that has examined the effect of such associative primes (here C) on performance 
to a target stimulus (B). Most often, it is assumed that the provision of such a prime will have 
a detrimental effect on the processing of a target stimulus (see Wagner, 1981). Application of 
this analysis predicts that B should elicit less responding when it is presented after C than 
when it is presented after D; because B will be less capable of provoking activity in the 
putative associative chain (see Honey, Good & Manser, 1998; Honey, Hall & Bonardi, 1993). 
There was some indication that this was the case in Experiment 3.  
It is certainly true that there are some differences between experiments conducted in 
Chapter 2 and those published by Blaisdell et al. (2006): for example, Blaisdell et al. (2006) 
used female rats tested in the dark portion of the cycle, while my studies used male rats tested 
in the light portion of the cycle, and the strain of animals differed (Long-Evans versus hooded 
Lister; for a further discussion see, Dwyer et al., 2009; Kutlu & Schmajuk, 2012). 
Differences of this type might have influenced the results of the experiments. However, if rats 
possess the ability to control their behaviour according to the output of a causal reasoning 
process, then this should be generally apparent, rather than being restricted to a single strain 
and sex of rats housed under particular conditions. The fact that the majority of studies fail to 
find the critical interaction consistent with causal model theory, suggests that the observation 
of this interaction might be due to things unrelated to causal reasoning. The balance of 
evidence does not make a compelling prima facie case for the existence of causal reasoning 
mechanisms in the rat, especially as it is possible, at least in principle, for associative 
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accounts to explain both Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) experiments and other reported data 
(Burgess, et al., 2012; Dwyer, et al., 2009). For instance, Kutlu and Schmajuk (2012) 
demonstrated that it was possible to simulate both Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) results and Dwyer 
et al.’s results (2009) using the attentional-associative SLG model. In overview, this 
simulation relied on the fact that the lever press forms an inhibitory relationship with food, 
because the lever press would be followed by the absence of an otherwise expected 
reinforcer. They also note that their model can explain the lack of an effect of a novel 
external cue as the “alternative cause” because this will be less salient than the lever press 
and thus support less inhibitory learning. While these simulations can account for the 
previously reported data, they do not speak to the effects of pre-training the lever as an 
alternative cause (as this might reduce the inhibitory learning because there was no food 
expected during the training phase) or explain how training external cues as alternative 
causes reverses the observed pattern of results. Regardless, the simulations by Kutlu and 
Schmajuk (2012) reinforce the view that even the results reported by Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) 
cannot be taken as unambiguously supporting a causal reasoning account, even if both the 
previously reported failures of replication, and the results from Chapter 2 were discounted.  
5.2.2. Causal binding 
The experiments reported in Chapter 3 provided no evidence of causal binding in rats. 
This conclusion clearly resonates with that reached on the basis of the experimental work 
reported in Chapter 2. However, rats require a great deal of training before they display 
accurate timing behaviour. This training greatly exceeded that given to human participants, 
but the main concern involved in overtraining is that the action may become habitual rather 
than controlled by a goal-directed process. This was addressed in the devaluation assessment 
in Experiment 6, which found a significant reduction in lever press responses for the 
devalued reward. A second concern with extensive training during these experiments is that 
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rats may initially underestimate the time between a lever press and its outcome, but learn over 
extensive training that the reward was not until a 5s delay. This was not possible to observe 
during these experiments because the data gathered in the initial phases of training was not 
appropriate for a curve fitting procedure.  
Although the results obtained here do not support a causal account of behaviour, they 
are in line with theories of timing, which implicitly assume that actions and observational 
stimuli are both time markers for the beginning of the interval. For instance, neither SET 
(Gibbon, 1977) nor LeT (Machado, 1997) make any distinction between timing from an 
action and external stimulus. Until now this assumption has not been directly assessed, and so 
the results of Chapter 3 provide support for current animal timing theories. The results are 
also in line with Wagner’s (1981) SOP, which also makes no distinction between actions and 
external cues.  
While the results of Experiments 4-6 might not be surprising in the context of models 
of timing, in other respects the similarity in timing functions across quite different temporal 
referents (instrumental responses and Pavlovian CSs) is a striking finding. For example, it has 
been argued that interventions (in the shape of instrumental responses) and observations (of 
CSs) differ in their access to the process of causal reasoning, with interventions having a 
privileged status (Leising et al., 2008). The results of Experiments 4-6 provide no evidence 
for such privileged access to the mechanisms that underlie timing behaviour in rats, no 
evidence of causal binding, and thereby join others in suggesting that it is premature to 
suggest that interventions and observations have a fundamentally different status in the rat 
(see also Chapter 2). 
5.2.3. Sensory Preconditioning 
The results of the first two experiments in Chapter 4 demonstrated a standard sensory 
preconditioning effect in consumption, whereby the directly paired stimulus, A, was 
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consumed less than its control, C, and the indirectly paired stimulus, B, was consumed less 
than its control, D. The same pattern of results was found in the directly paired stimuli in the 
lick cluster data, but the indirectly paired stimulus showed no difference. That is, it seems 
that the rats avoid drinking much of the indirectly paired stimulus, due to its association with 
illness, but they drink it in the same way as another stimulus which has no association with 
illness. This pattern was seen across different LiCl doses. Thus, accounts based on some form 
of reasoning and some associative analyses are both undermined, as both these accounts 
would predict that the animals would respond in the same manner in both types of 
behavioural measures (i.e., B should show a marked aversion in both consumption and lick 
cluster data). The final experiment of Chapter 4 looked at whether introducing a trace 
affected the lick cluster data of the directly paired stimulus (i.e., whether introducing a trace 
affects how the rat responds to A). The critical finding in this experiment revealed that this 
trace to the directly paired stimulus made the rats respond more like their responding to B in 
the lick cluster data but not the consumption data.  
There are a number of modifications, some more radical than others, that one can 
make to associative analyses that allow them to explain the results of Chapter 4. The first is 
based upon the distinction between preparatory and consummatory responses. It has been 
argued that preparatory responses (those involving approaching the drinking spout) influence 
the amount (e.g., the total number of licks) but not the form of consumption (e.g., the size of 
lick clusters); and consummatory responses (directed at the liquid spout) influence both the 
amount and form of consumption (Dwyer, 2009; Dwyer, et al., 2009). Consummatory 
conditioning is typically thought to be supported by detailed sensory/perceptual 
representations of the stimuli involved, while preparatory conditioning relates to more 
diffuse/gnostic representations (e.g., Dickinson & Balleine, 2002; Konorski, 1967; Wagner & 
Brandon, 1989). Thus any analysis which suggests that direct conditioning and SPC differ in 
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the sensory or perceptual specificity of the critical representations would be entirely 
consistent with the observed data. Within an associative chain analysis of SPC, the memories 
of B and LiCl are more remote from one another than are those of A and LiCl. As increasing 
the remoteness of CS and US can reduce the sensory specificity of responding then this might 
lead to the lack of consummatory responding to B as compared to A (Colwill & Motzkin, 
1994; see also, Honey & Hall, 1992). The results of Experiment 10 are consistent with this 
general analysis, insofar as introducing a trace interval during direct conditioning had no 
significant effect on consumption but did influence lick cluster size. The configural analysis 
might also imply differences in representational specificity, insofar as direct conditioning is 
mediated by activation of a memory of A, but SPC is mediated by the ability of B to activate 
a memory of AB.  
 Alternatively, it has been argued that SPC might reflect a form of mediated learning: 
after exposure to AB, the presentation of B associatively provokes either the elemental 
memory (A; or the configural memory, AB) into the A2 state and this associatively provoked 
memory becomes linked to the US (Iordanova et al., 2011). Now, when B is presented at test 
it will be able to activate a memory of LiCl independently of any direct association that the 
memory of A has with LiCl (Rescorla & Freberg, 1978; Ward-Robinson, Coutureau, Honey, 
& Killcross, 2005; Ward-Robinson & Hall, 1996). This separation of representation-mediated 
conditioning from direct conditioning provides a basis upon which different types of 
associative knowledge, and response forms, might develop in SPC and standard forms of 
conditioning. For example, Lin and Honey (2010, 2011) have suggested that animals are able 
to form distinct associations involving the A1 and A2 states of a given stimulus. In the case 
under consideration, it must be supposed that what is learned when an associatively activated 
memory of B is paired with LiCl supports the development of preparatory responses, but not 
consummatory responses; whereas its directly activated counterpart supports the development 
113 
 
of both. This analysis received further support from the results of Experiment 10, wherein the 
A2 state was modulated by a trace interval rather than by association. The fact that the 
dissociation produced by trace conditioning was less profound than that observed in SPC 
might simply indicate that our trace interval was less effective in generating the A2 state than 
was SPC. 
 To conclude this section: The dissociation between the behaviours generated by direct 
conditioning and SPC undermine conventional associative accounts of SPC that assume 
stimulus substitution or a propositional account of behaviour. Each of the attempts to capture 
this dissociation assumes that there is a difference in the nature, and not just strength, of a 
representation that has been directly activated by its corresponding stimulus and one that has 
been associatively activated. Further research will be necessary to both establish the 
generality of the observations presented here and to enhance our understanding of them.  
5.3. Future directions 
 The results of Chapter 2 clearly show that causal model theory does not account for 
rat behaviour (e.g., Waldmann, et al., 2008; Waldmann, et al., 2006; Waldmann & Holyoak, 
1992). However, causal model theory is only one account of causal learning in humans. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, before Blaisdell et al.’s (2009) study, most assessments of causal 
understanding in animals was by using the trap tube task. The adaptation of Waldmann and 
Hagmayer’s (2005) study in rats really was a breakthrough in assessing causal understanding 
in animals. The methodology employed could easily be used with other species to assess the 
similarity (or dissimilarity) in cognition between humans and non-human animals. For 
instance, it may be the case that animals which have a more similar evolutionary background 
to humans (e.g., chimps) have evolved the capacity to reason in a manner consistent with 
causal model theory. Assessing different species would enable us to gain an idea of whether 
this capacity has evolved in animals other than humans. However, as noted in Chapter 1, 
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Waldmann and Hagmayer’s design directly provided the participants with scenarios, meaning 
the participants did not have to form the causal models through experience. Thus it would 
also be interesting to observe how human participants would behave given similar training 
procedures to rats. If this procedure did not produce “reasoning” behaviour in human 
subjects, it would be necessary to re-evaluate its application to non-human animals. 
 Chapter 3 reveals no similarity in findings between the human studies of temporal 
binding and the rat adaptation of those studies. These results have no negative impact on 
current theories of timing, which already treat observations and interventions similarly, and 
include no mechanism for causal binding. However, there are clearly many differences in the 
methodology employed between rats and humans. For instance, the only difference in 
conditions in the Buehner and Humphreys (2009) study was that in one condition an action is 
trained as causally related to the outcome, and thus it may be worth assessing whether the 
methodology used in rats produces the causal binding effect in humans. That is, train humans 
that two stimuli (an external stimulus and an action) are both followed by an outcome 5s after 
their offset. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, it is important to assess whether the task 
produces the desired results in humans. If it does not, again its application to other species 
would need to be addressed. That said, MacPhail (1982) has eloquently explained that cross-
species comparisons are fraught with difficulties due to differences in sensory or motor 
capacity (amongst many others). So the types of cross-species comparisons noted in the 
previous two paragraphs would only be the beginning of a genuinely comparative 
investigation of causal representation and reasoning.  
In the discussion of Chapter 3, a caveat with the procedure employed was noted; that 
the rats may be timing from the lever withdrawal rather than the lever press itself. One 
potential alternative to the methodology used in Chapter 3 is to leave the lever extended into 
the chamber. The issue with using this method is that it is likely the rats will press the lever 
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more than once before the reinforcer is delivered (and thus it will be unclear which lever 
press caused the delivery of food). That said, it is possible to train rats to wait before pressing 
a lever again, by not reinforcing multiple presses. Food would be provided 5s after the last 
LP, but if the rat presses again in that interval, then the timer resets. The control (CS) 
condition would need to be yoked to the LP condition, such that the distribution of CS-food 
trials would be the same as the distribution of LP-food trials.  
However, this still raises the possibility of providing an external cue to the animals 
once they have pressed the lever; the lever returning to its original position could act as a 
time marker. Another possible alternative procedure is to employ the methodology of the 
bisection task (Church & Deluty, 1977). To assess whether rats underestimate the interval 
following an action, two conditions would be assessed. In the action condition, rats would be 
required to pull a chain, and the external cue condition would present a CS. These would each 
be followed by a long or short delay to a tone, and the rats would be required to respond to a 
right lever if the delay was long, and a left lever if the delay was short. During the test, the 
interval between the chain pull, or the light, and the tone would be set to vary between 5 and 
10s (intermixed with training trials). The proportion of long responses (i.e., right lever 
presses) can be plotted for each condition, and a curve fit conducted to assess whether the 
mean (that is, when the proportion of long responses is at 50%) is earlier for the action 
condition than for the external cue condition.  
 Chapter 4 produced perhaps the most thought provoking results. While an account for 
these results has been suggested (Section 5.2.3), it deserves further exploration. Firstly, it 
would be interesting to see how rats respond to compound cues at test (e.g., AB, AD, CB, 
CD; see also, Lin, Dumigan, Dwyer, Good, & Honey, in press). The account developed here 
suggests that the presence of the directly conditioned cues (presumably in A1) need not 
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prevent their corresponding A2 states from evoking the US. That is, the sensory 
preconditioning effects should survive the presence of the directly conditioned stimuli.  
5.4. Conclusion 
The results from all the chapters in this thesis point to the same conclusion: rats do not 
represent the causal texture of the environment in the same manner as humans. The notion 
that animals may not process information like humans has been around since Morgan (1894), 
who suggested that, as many different species had arisen from evolution, many different 
minds must have also arisen. Therefore, he argued that to attribute human thought processes 
to animals without excluding other alternatives is unscientific. This thesis has entertained the 
possibility that the behaviour of rats might be underpinned by various forms of reasoning; but 
the experimental results reported here have only served to reinforce the simpler alternatives, 
rather than ruling them out. 
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